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ABSTRACT 
Because of concerns about possible Merchant Mariner manpower shortages or 
skill mismatch needed to crew DoD organic vessels during a major contingency, the 
Maritime Administration (MARAD) has proposed the development of a guaranteed surge 
pool of experienced inactive mariners available to ensure timely and adequate manning of 
its Ready Reserve Force (RRF). This pool would be a supplement, not a replacement, to 
the current active pool of mariners used to crew the RRF. This initiative is centered on 
using the United States Maritime Service (USMS) concept. Two main options were 
proposed: create a stand-alone USMS program under MARAD, and/or integrate the 
USMS concept with Navy's Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR) program. 
Fourteen structured interviews were conducted with strategic sealift stakeholders 
and experts in order to provide MARAD and the Navy with elements of how these 
pools/programs could be developed and to identify the option that stakeholders believe is 
the best approach. Interview results revealed that a stand-alone USMS program, 
providing it could overcome various obstacles, was the preferred approach. Analysis and 
recommendations are provided on how both pools could be developed and what issues 
need to be resolved prior to either program implementation. An alternate approach to use 
the MMR program for RRF ere wing is provided as well. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
Among the ongoing efforts at MARAD is the assessment of the supply of 
mariners to meet commercial and mobilization crewing requirements, now 
and in the future. Right now, MARAD is seeing and hearing of 
recruitment and retention problems in the seagoing workforce, just as 
every industry is facing labor shortages in this vibrant economy. Based on 
our analysis of mariner data, there are enough qualified active seafarers to 
crew the DOD organic fleet for a short duration, but this could dry up 
much of the pool. An extended mobilization of the entire government- 
owned surge fleet would create pressure to rotate government and 
commercial ship crews, by augmenting the pool with inactive mariners. 
There is likely to be a mismatch between available mariners and the 
specific skills needed to fully activate the DOD organic fleet. We are also 
concerned that shoreside commitments of some of the inactive mariners - 
such as work and family ~ may keep them from volunteering to serve, 
even with re-employment rights. These uncertainties concern us. (Clyde 
Hart, JR. MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR BEFORE THE 
COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
U.S. SENATE IN SUPPORT OF FISCAL YEAR 2001 
AUTHORIZATION, 16 May 2000) 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) consists of 76 vessels that are owned by the U.S. 
Government. The RRF program exists to ensure that, in the event of a contingency, 
organic capabilities exist to transport Department of Defense (DoD) assets within given 
timeframes. The RRF provides the majority of the cargo capacity with the "surge" 
element of sealift, joined by the 19 surge ships of Military Sealift Command (MSC). The 
ships are maintained in various readiness states as defined by U.S. Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) to meet prescribed cargo loadout. The RRF is maintained 
by the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) to be able to reactivate with four, five, 
ten or 20 days. Ships with a readiness of four or five are maintained in Reduced 
Operating Status (ROS) and have a full-time partial crew (ten and nine persons, 
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respectively) to conduct maintenance and keep the ship in the higher readiness status. 
Ships in ten or 20-day status do not have assigned crews onboard. 
MARAD, an agency of the Department of Transportation (DOT), is responsible 
for the management of the RRF program. MARAD contracts with commercial ship 
managers to operate and maintain RRF vessels. These ship managers draw qualified 
Merchant Mariners from their various contracted commercial maritime labor unions. 
Upon activation of the RRF ships, MARAD would direct the shipping companies to 
provide additional personnel to fully crew the vessels. 
In the event of a major contingency, a significant or full activation of the RRF 
would be required. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 79 of the then 96 RRF ships 
were activated by MARAD. There were two main problems encountered with the 
activation of the RRF ships. One was the physical condition and readiness level of the 
ships that prevented some ships from meeting their required activation times. The other 
problem was that the ships had not been active in a long time, some as long as 14 years. 
Enough qualified merchant marines were found, but the activation of the RRF and the 
war put a significant strain on the U.S. Merchant Marine manpower pool. If the war had 
continued for a longer period, both the government and commercial fleets would have 
encountered more strenuous crewing problems. 
Today, the available manpower pool needed for normal or peacetime operation, 
surge/mobilization requirements, and sustainment (with commercial U.S.-flag ships) 
operations are a concern for everyone involved in strategic sealift. The concern is 
whether the peacetime pool is large enough to satisfy peacetime and mobilization 
requirements. In a practical sense, with only 300 large commercial vessels under U.S. 
flag, is the peacetime, commercial mariner pool sufficiently sized to meet a wartime, 
government surge crewing requirement to activate about 100 organic ships? Most 
experts agree that there could be a manpower shortage if the RRF had to be activated for 
a significant period of time (NDTA, 2000). Given the important role that merchant 
mariners play in supporting the government's strategic sealift mission, what could or 
should be done to ensure adequate, qualified mariners, with the required qualifications, 
are available? There are numerous actions that the government could take to address this 
concern. One initiative that MARAD has proposed is establishing a guaranteed surge 
pool of inactive mariners available to ensure timely and adequate manning of the RRF. 
The initiative is centered on using the United States Maritime Service (USMS) concept to 
develop the pool. This thesis explores the options available in the development of a pool 
using the USMS. 
By using the USMS concept, there are three main approaches to the establishment 
of a guaranteed pool that MARAD could take. First, it could develop a new dedicated 
stand-alone pool of inactive merchant mariners under the sole control of MARAD. A 
second option is to integrate the USMS concept with the Navy's Merchant Marine 
Reserve (MMR) Program. The MMR consists of Selected Reservists and Individual 
Ready Reserves (MMIRRG) that have valid Coast Guard licenses (deck, engine, or 
radio). There are approximately 2400 officers in the MMR Program. The second 
approach would allow MARAD to take advantage of an existing program that can 
provide for the mariner's training and qualification needs, but have the flexibility to recall 
these mariners as civilian mariners instead of military officers to serve on MARAD 
3 
vessels. The third approach is to have both a stand-alone USMS pool under MARAD 
and a program that allows mariners to be in both the USMS and the MMR. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the potential role that the United States 
Maritime Service concept could play in developing a guaranteed surge pool of mariners 
to support Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ere wing needs. It will describe the current roles, 
missions, aspects, and organizations involved in United States (U.S.) strategic sealift. 
Based on information obtained from stakeholders involved in strategic sealift and the 
U.S. Merchant Marine, this thesis will then provide some of the elements necessary for 
the development of a stand-alone USMS organization or a combined USMS/MMR 
program. It will also identify the option that industry experts believe is the best 
approach. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary 
• Given the need for a backup pool, what is the best approach to satisfy the 
need: a USMS stand-alone program, a combined USMS/MMR program, 
or a combination of both? 
2. Secondary 
• What are the major advantages and disadvantages for each of these 
options? 
• What incentives are needed to entice individual mariners to join and 
remain in the program and for affected organizations to support/participate 
in a USMS program? 
• What are the training and qualification requirements? 
• What are the sign up and obligation requirements for members 
participating in the program? 
• What organization(s) should manage the programs? 
• What are the obstacles (real or perceived) in using the USMS concept? 
• What are the opinions of stakeholders on forming a stand-alone pool or a 
dual USMS/MMR pool? 
D. SCOPE 
The thesis will focus on the development of a manning pool of merchant mariners 
for the RRF using the USMS concept. Based on a literature review and information 
obtained from interviews, it will propose a stand-alone USMS organization, a combined 
USMS/MMR program, or a combination of a stand-alone and USMS/MMR program. 
The thesis will also provide some of the key elements necessary to develop both 
approaches, and discuss the obstacles, the pros and cons, and opinions on the two pool 
options obtained from interviews of industry experts and stakeholders. Also, the number 
and type of RRF vessels and their crewing requirements provided by MARAD will be 
taken at face value and not specifically analyzed. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
A literature review as well as interviews will be used to conduct this research. A 
new USMS organization and/or a combined USMS and MMR organization will be 
described and developed based on themes derived from analysis of the interviews. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter II will provide background 
information on the organizations and programs that would be involved or effected in 
creating this new pool of mariners, the status of the U.S. Merchant Mariner pool, and a 
brief history of the USMS. It will also discuss the actions and initiatives currently being 
pursued that would impact the active mariner pool or effect the creation of a new USMS 
inactive mariner pool. Chapter III will describe the research methods and methodologies 
used in conducting the interviews. Chapter IV will summarize the results of the data 
obtained from the interviews. Chapter V provides conclusions, a recommended course of 
action, and suggestions for further studies. 
II.      BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before a new concept such as the USMS can be discussed or developed, it is 
important to have a frame of reference to understand why the topic of strategic sealift is 
relevant and to understand its relationship with previous and current practice, the 
environment, and areas affected by or affecting its development. The overarching area 
involved for this thesis is strategic sealift. Strategic sealift encompasses several related 
areas, including the U.S. government vessels and commercial ships used to move 
material, the U.S. Merchant Marine, and the programs, organizations, and relationships in 
place that help ensure the U.S. can perform its strategic sealift mission. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY AND SEALIFT 
America's military is arguably the best trained and possesses the most 
technologically advanced equipment in terms of quality and quantity of any military in 
the world. However, having the best military is of little value unless it has the capability 
to quickly transport that force to the battlefield, no matter where in the world that is 
located. To transport our force, the U.S. employs a strategic mobility system. The 
strategic mobility system consists of the equipment, personnel, and logistics know-how 
that enables the Department of Defense to deliver forces great distances. 
The strategic mobility (or lift) system consists of three parts: strategic airlift, 
strategic sealift, and prepositioning. Strategic airlift uses aircraft to fly in cargo and 
personnel, strategic sealift uses ships to transport cargo from the United States, and 
prepositioning uses ships or warehouses located abroad. Prepositioning allows the 
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United States to place military assets in locations close to where conflicts are likely to 
occur. (CBO 1997)  All three parts of strategic mobility have their strengths and 
weaknesses. Airlift is fast but is limited in space and weight and is also costly. Sealift is 
slower but has the ability to carry a significant amount of cargo (weight and size). 
Prepositioning is able to get material to the objective quickly, provided that it is staged 
near the geographic location of the conflict.   The DoD cannot complete its mission in 
the event of a major theater war (MTW), let alone two, without all three components 
functioning properly and to their fullest potential. 
1.        Strategic Sealift 
During Desert Shield/Storm, 95 percent of all assets were transported to the 
theater via strategic sealift. Several factors or planning assumptions help determine the 
capacity, number, type/composition, and location of these strategic sealift vessels. They 
are as follows: 
• Type of conflict anticipated 
• Location, sequence, and number of MTWs 
• Make-up of the Battleforce.   What are the warfighter's requirements for 
delivery of what materials when? 
• Cost of using one type of mobility instead of another or using organic 
assets versus commercial 
• Speed:     When  is  the   equipment/material  needed?     What  are  the 
timeframes? 
• Lessons learned from previous mobility operations, including Operation 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
• The strengths and weaknesses of a given asset or type of mobility. 
Using these factors and many other inputs, three requirement studies have been 
completed since the completion of Desert Shield/Storm. They are the Mobility 
Requirements Study (MRS) of 1992, the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up 
8 
Review Update (MRS BURU) of 1995, and the Mobility Requirements Study of 2000 
(MRS-05). The scenario used for planning is one where the United States will fight two 
nearly simultaneous MTWs on the Korean Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf region. 
(CBO 1997) 
Strategic sealift's role of delivering cargo to support the anticipated scenario can 
be categorized into two parts: surge and sustainment shipping. Surge shipping would 
deliver the necessary equipment for combat and support units within the first 20 days of 
the start of a conflict with the first ship available for loading in about 96 hours upon 
activation notice. The MRS BURU study determined that the target amount of capacity 
for surge shipping is ten million square feet of cargo. (CBO 1997) Sustainment shipping 
would deliver the required supplies (fuel, food, spare parts, ammunitions, etc.) to 
resupply operations. MRS-05 determined that an additional one million square feet was 
required, bringing the total to 11 million square feet. 
Strategic Sealift can also be broken down into two types of assets: organic and 
commercial. Organic sealift vessels are owned or controlled by the U.S. Government. 
Commercial sealift vessels are domestic and foreign ships that the U.S. has access to via 
readiness agreements, time charters, and through the commercial spot charter market. 
The United States has five categories of sealift vessels to complete the strategic 
sealift surge and sustainment missions: 1) The Military Sealift Command (MSC) Force, 
2) The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) controlled by the MARAD, 3) U.S. Commercial 
Shipping, 4) Effective U.S. Control (EUSC) ships, and 5) Other Allies. (MSC, 2001) 
The MSC Force and the RRF are the United States' organic assets that complete the 
Strategie sealift surge mission. U.S. Commercial Shipping, EUSC, and Other Allies are 
considered commercial assets and are used primarily for sustainment missions. Appendix 
A lists the total number of ships and types in these categories. The remainder of this 
section will provide amplifying information on each of these categories, with the 
exception of the Ready Reserve Force, which is described in section C. 
2. MSC Force 
The Military Sealift Command currently controls 59 ships in the MSC Force 
category of strategic sealift inventory. All of the ships in this category are considered 
organic assets. Of these 59 ships, 50 carry dry cargo and nine are tankers designed 
primarily to carry petroleum products and include underway replenishment capability. 
These ships make up all of the afloat prepositioning assets and a portion of our surge 
assets. Thirty-three of these ships comprise the Prepositioning Program. Two types or 
classes of ships, the Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) and the Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll- 
off (LMSR), are the backbone (or will eventually become the backbone) of surge sealift 
capacity in this category. 
3. U.S. Commercial 
The U.S. Commercial category has a total of 198 ships: 111 dry cargo, 86 tankers, 
and one passenger. (MSC 2001) These ships are considered sustainment type assets. 
This category can be further broken down into two other commercial ship categories: 
Readiness Agreements and Other U.S. Commercial. The following will focus on ships 
(or capacity of ships) that are involved in readiness agreements, specifically, the 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), and the Maritime Security Program 
(MSP). 
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a.        Maritime Security Program (MSP) 
In October 1996, President Clinton signed into law (Public Law 104-239) 
the Maritime Security Program. Part of the Maritime Security Act (MSA), MSP makes 
military useful commercial U.S.-flag ships available to the U.S. Government. These 
ships are owned by U.S. citizens and crewed by American merchant mariners. There are 
currently 47 ships in the program controlled by ten companies. In addition to the MSP 
ships themselves, the program participants/companies bring the necessary network of 
logistics management services, terminals and equipment, communications, and cargo 
tracking systems. (MSA 1998) 
MSP costs the government 2.1 million dollars per ship annually or 
approximately $100 million per year. Funding is authorized though the life of the 
program until FY2005. (Thompson 1998) Administered by MARAD, MSP was 
established to replace a program known as the Operating-Differential Subsidy (ODS) 
program. Similar to MSP, ODS paid carriers the difference between the higher costs, 
specifically labor costs, that U.S.-flagged vessels incurred as opposed to foreign-flag 
vessels. 
MSP has several advantages and is a significant improvement over ODS. 
First, because the U.S. paid the cost difference between operating a U.S-flagged vessel 
and operating a foreign-flag vessel, ODS provided little incentive for ship operators to 
control wages. This resulted in a cost of approximately four million dollars per ship per 
year. Also, ODS put restrictions on ships operating routes. MSP does not restrict 
operating routes and pays a flat rate instead of a differential U.S versus foreign cost 
amount. (Donnelly 1999) Second, MSP, similar to an insurance policy, provides 
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military- useful vessels for sustainment shipping that relieves the U.S. from having to 
purchase/maintain or contract for vessels on a full-time basis. Third, MSP, as did ODS, 
helps the U.S. commercial shipping industry by assuring a continued U.S. presence in 
international trade and access to world markets with U.S. vessels. Fourth, MSP helps to 
ensure that there is a pool of trained and experienced U.S. mariners to operate these and 
other ships when needed in the event of a contingency. Finally, as a condition of 
acceptance in MSP, the vessel owner must pledge the vessel capacity to VISA, the 
emergency preparedness program approved by DOT and DoD. 
b. Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) 
Similar to MSP, VISA is another partnership with the U.S. commercial 
shipping industry intended to make commercial vessel capacity and intermodal 
infrastructure available during a contingency. VISA exists under MARAD authority for 
voluntary agreements with industry as amended in the Defense Production Act of 1950 
and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Secretary of Defense Cohen approved it on 
January 30, 1997. (VISA 2000) It is based on the Air Force's Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF) Program and like CRAF, provides support in three stages of activation, with the 
final stage implemented only during times of dire crisis.. Although similar to CRAF's 
Wide Body Equivalent, VISA does not name specific ships in the agreement but rather 
commits ship capacity. Stage I has 15 percent of the capacity and Stage II has 25 percent 
of shipping capacity of participating firms enrolled in the program. 
VISA, like MSP, assures critical sealift capacity is available for 
contingencies, contributes to a healthy U.S. Merchant Marine, and balances defense and 
economic elements of commercial transportation for national security. VISA and MSP 
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are complementary programs. More than 80 percent of U.S.-flag commercial shipping is 
enrolled in VISA Stage III. In fact, Stage III requires participants to commit a minimum 
of 50 percent of their non-MSP assets and 100 percent of their MSP vessel assets. A total 
of 70 percent of the companies with vessels enrolled in MSP participate in VISA Stage 
III. (VISA 2000) 
c.        Effective U.S. Control 
The Effective U.S. Control (EUSC) category consists of 117 ships. (MSC 
2001) The EUSC or "flag-of-convenience" concept was developed by the Roosevelt 
Administration prior to the start of World War II as a means to circumvent the Neutrality 
Act. (Transportation Institute 2000) By encouraging U.S. ship owners to register their 
ships in Panama and Honduras, it allowed the U.S. to transport aid to European "allies" 
before the U.S. entered the conflict. Since then, other countries such as Liberia, the 
Bahamas, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands have also established flag-of- 
convenience open registries for U.S. owned merchant ships. 
The requisitioning provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provides 
for MARAD to take control of these ships when the President specifically authorizes 
such action through Executive Order during a national emergency. The capacity 
provided by these ships would be a tremendous asset if utilized. However, there are 
some concerns about EUSC. For one, requisitioning authority has been untested since 
WWII, and there are differing legal opinions whether the process to acquire these ships 
will work. Second, countries that have EUSC ships could potentially use legal 
roadblocks to prevent the U.S Government from exercising its requisitioning authority. 
Finally, although there are 117 ships available, these ships have a limited utility for DoD 
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because most are large tankers or bulk carriers, not the primary military cargo carriers 
desired by DoD. (Tokarski 2001) 
d. Other Allies 
The 59 ships that comprise the "Other Allies" category are ships named in 
a bilateral shipping agreement with the Republic of Korea. The program is known as the 
Korean Flag Shipping (KFS) Program. The 59 ships are all Korean-flagged commercial 
ships that are not controlled by the Korean Government. The program originated with a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Republic of Korea on 25 
Mar 81. Since then, Standard Operation Procedures have been developed to discuss 
specific procedures for activation of these vessels. (KFS SOP 1995) 
The KFS Program ensures that additional shipping assets are readily 
available in the event of a major contingency in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On a day- 
to-day basis, these ships are not controlled by MSC or ROK, but during such a 
contingency, control of these ships would transfer to MSC. 
This program has several benefits. First, it shows a commitment by the 
ROK to help defend itself from an invasion. Second, it significantly increases the sealift 
capacity needed to support a MTW with assets that are familiar with the country and that 
are typically geographically located near Korea before the contingency begins. Third, it 
is a tremendous cost saver for the United States government. No funds are paid to the 
ROK or the ship owners to participate in this agreement. The program also saves money 
if and when these ships are activated because the U.S. will not be responsible for paying 
for the daily charter costs to operate these ships nor will they be required to pay for the 
ship's war insurance. 
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C.       READY RESERVE FORCE 
The Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) program was created in 1976 to support the rapid 
worldwide deployment of U.S military forces. In 1985, the name was changed to the 
Ready Reserve Force. The RRF consists of 76 ships down from a Desert Shield/Storm 
high of 96. MARAD maintains these militarily useful ships at all times. Operational 
Control (OPCON) of these ships transfers to Military Sealift Command (MSC) during 
wartime or a contingency while administrative control remains with MARAD. These 
ships are actually part of a subcomponent of MARAD's National Defense Reserve Fleet 
(NDRF) that consists of 237 ships. Although managed by MARAD, Congressional 
funding for the program goes to the Navy-administered National Defense Sealift Fund. 
Current inventory consists of 31 Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/ROs), 15 breakbulk, three Seabee 
ships, four LASH ships, two troopships, nine tankers, two aviation logistics support 
ships, and ten auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS). Four of the vessels are tendered to MSC 
for long term prepositioning missions. RRF ships are all considered organic assets and 
comprise over approximately five million square feet of DoD's surge shipping capacity. 
(CBO 1997)   They are strategically located at outport locations to avoid congestion, to 
be closer to actual military loading ports, and provide quick response to military force 
requirements. (NVR 1999) 
All RRF ships have a readiness designation that describes the number of days it 
would take to make a ship fully operational and ready for sea upon activation 
notification. A lesson learned from Desert Shield/Storm was that the RRF was poorly 
maintained due to limited maintenance and readiness testing funding levels and took 
longer to activate than anticipated, resulting in ships being late on average often days. 
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(CBO 1997) To correct this problem, Congress increased appropriations to improve the 
material state of readiness and established new readiness categories for some vessels by 
adding small partial crews (reduced operating status (ROS)). Ships are now kept in 
readiness status of ROS-4, ROS-5, RRF-10, and RRF-20. ROS-4 and ROS-5 ships have 
a ten or nine member crew on board, respectively, that performs maintenance. They are 
skilled in the activation process and will sail with the ship when activated. This relieves 
ships in ROS-4 and ROS-5 status from having to be towed to a shipyard for activation. 
Additionally, ships in ROS-4 conduct annual sea trials, and ships in ROS-5 alternate each 
year between sea trials and dockside trials to validate readiness. Ships in the RRF-10 and 
RRF-20 categories also conduct sea and dock trials, but less frequently but more 
importantly do not have small crews onboard. 
D.        MANNING AND OPERATION OF THE RRF 
Through MARAD's oversight of the RRF program, commercial ship management 
firms are hired to operate and maintain the ships. The various firms in turn hire U.S. 
Merchant Mariners from their various contracted maritime labor unions to maintain and 
operate the ships. The contract award to ship managers determines labor sources for the 
RRF. These maritime labor contracts are between the shipping companies and the 
unions, not with MARAD. (MARAD 1999) 
1. Typical Ship Manning Structure 
RRF vessels have the same basic shipboard manning or mariner structure used on 
commercially operated ships. There are two categories of mariners that serve on ships: 
licensed and unlicensed. Licensed officers are further broken down between deck 
officers and engineering officers. The following shows the basic structure, primary 
duties, and typical ship population for licensed mariners: 
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DECK OFFICERS: 
1 - Master 
1- Chief Mate 
1- Second Mate 
1-Third Mate 
1- Radio Officer (duties may be assumed by Global Maritime Distress & Safety 
System (GMDSS)-qualified deck officers) 
Primary duties: navigation, safety, cargo operations, ship's business, and 
communications 
ENGINEERING OFFICERS: 
1- Chief Engineer 
1- First Assistant Engineer 
1- Second Assistant Engineer 
1-2 Third Assistant Engineer 
Primary duties: operating engineering plant, maintenance and repair. 
Unlicensed mariners serve in one of three shipboard departments: deck, engine, 
and stewards. Basic structure, duties, and population are as follows: 
DECK DEPARTMENT: 
6-10 ratings: Bosun (one), Able Seamen (AB), Ordinary Seaman (OS). 
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Duties include bridge watch, helmsman, lookout, deck maintenance, line handling, 
and assisting the deck officer with cargo loading oversight. 
Engine Department: 
1-6 ratings: Qualified Member of Engine Department (12 endorsements for 
QMED), tankerman / pumpman. 
Note: The degree of engine automation affects manning level 
Duties include engine room watch, maintenance and repairs, electrician, and 
refrigeration. 
Stewards Department: 
2-6 members: Chief Steward, Cook, Baker, Messmen 
Duties include providing messing and hotel services (MARAD, 1999) 
RRF ship manning is shown in Appendix B. Appendix B breaks down the 
required manning on the 76 RRF ships in four categories: ROS Licensed, ROS 
Unlicensed, Surge Licensed, and Surge Unlicensed. ROS personnel are mariners that are 
assigned to the RRF ships on a full-time basis (RRF ROS). These are ships in ROS-4 and 
ROS-5 status. The additional mariners needed to fully crew all RRF ships make up the 
surge category (RRF SURGE). Also, although counted as surge numbers, the mariners 
that crew the four ships tendered to MSC that are being used as active prepositioning 
ships on a full-time basis are accounted for separately (RRF PREPO). There is a total of 
135 mariners in RRF PREPO status, and 485 mariners employed full-time on ships in 
RRF ROS status.    In the event of a full activation, an additional 1886 mariners would be 
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required to man the surge requirement for all 76 ships, resulting in a total number of 2506 
mariners. 
E.       MERCHANT MARINE RESERVE U.S. NAVAL RESERVE PROGRAM 
The Naval Reserve, which shall be a component part of the United States 
Navy, shall consist of three classes, namely the Fleet Reserve, the 
Merchant Marine Naval Reserve, and the Volunteer Naval Reserve (43 
STAT1080,1090,28Feb25) 
Congress established the Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR) Program as a 
component of the U.S. Navy via the Naval Reserve Act of 1925. In 1938, the name was 
changed to the Merchant Marine Reserve. The program was designed to facilitate 
coordination and integrated operations between the U.S. Merchant Marine and the U.S. 
Navy. The program was also designed based on the Declaration of Policy statement from 
Title I of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. It required the United States to have a 
Merchant Marine capable of serving as a naval military auxiliary in time of war or 
national e^eygency. It also required Merchant Marine officers employed on subsidized 
or DOT vessels to be members of the Naval Reserve, if eligible. (OPNAV N42 1999) 
Since its inception, the MMR Program has gone through several reorganizations 
and changed directions. Today's program, established March 1979, is intended to ensure 
the continued mutual support, coordination, and cooperation between the U.S. Navy and 
the U. S. Merchant Marine. The MMR Program provides a uniquely qualified pool of 
Merchant Marine officers. These officers have civilian merchant mariner experience and 
valid U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) licenses as well as the naval training and professional 
development possessed by Naval Officers. The specific stated mission of the MMR 
Program is to: 
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Maintain in the USNR an organization of Merchant Marine officers 
composed of: 
a. A corps of actively sailing members who are trained to operate 
merchant ships as naval and military auxiliaries; and, 
b. A shoreside cadre assigned to naval activities that support strategic 
sealift readiness. (MMR Handbook, 2000) 
1. Organization 
The MMR Program's structure and organization is different from most Naval 
Reserve programs, to account for the unique nature of merchant mariners. Merchant 
mariners who are actively sailing are typically at sea eight months out of the year at any 
given time. The program consists of two types of officers: Selected Reservists (SELRES) 
and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Over 95 percent of program participants belong to 
the IRR component, referred to as the Merchant Marine Individual Ready Reserve Group 
(MMIRRG). The MMR Program is further broken down into three different categories: 
a. Midshipman Category 
This category includes students attending the U.S. Merchant Marine 
Academy (USMMA), state and regional maritime academies, and other selected maritime 
schools. The category is designed to qualify participants for active or reserve 
commissioned service. Participants include all students at the USMMA and students at 
the state and other academies that participate in the Student Incentive Program (SIP). 
b. IRR Category 
As previously mentioned, members in this category make up the 
MMIRRG. Officers in this category are not affiliated with an organized reserve unit. 
The MMIRRG satisfies the sea mission of the MMR Program by providing personnel 
who are trained to operate merchant ships as naval and military auxiliaries. These 
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officers have valid USCG licenses and are required to be actively sailing or in the 
maritime industry. 
c. SELRES Category 
This consists of two components: the Merchant Marine Reserve 
Operational Command Headquarters (MMROCH) Units and MMR Sealift Support 
Billets. Members in these types of units fulfill the MMR Program's shore mission. They 
provide trained personnel to Navy activities and other government agencies that support 
strategic sealift readiness. 
2. MMR Program Designators 
Officers in the MMR Program are assigned one of four designators, based 
on their qualifications and background. These special duty restricted line designators are: 
• 1625 - Merchant Marine, Deck 
• 1665 - Merchant Marine, Deck and Engineering 
•> 1675 - Merchant Marine, Engineering 
• 1695 - Merchant Marine, Communications 
These four designators correspond very closely to the U.S. Merchant 
Marine equivalents for areas of licenses in the three main areas. 
3. Sources of Officers and Obligation Requirements 





U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) graduates 
California, Great Lakes, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas 
State Maritime Academies 
Direct Commission for Non-Academy Graduates 
Transfer from other Reserve Programs 
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Some officers join or participate in the MMR Program by choice (i.e., designator 
change, direct commission, or after satisfactory completing of initial service agreement 
obligations). The majority of program participants are graduates from the U.S. Merchant 
Marine Academy or State Academies that affiliate to satisfy obligations they incur from 
participation in Training and Service Agreements (TSA). The TSAs require personnel 
under these agreements to obligate to the MMR or satisfy other requirements. 
The primary TSA is the MMR, USNR TSA, which is the Midshipman Program 
(CNET 1534/2 or 1534/3). Officers who graduate from the U.S Merchant Marine 
Academy or participate in the Student Incentive Program (SIP) at a state maritime 
academy are considered program participants and assume an eight-year and six-year 
obligation respectively at commission/graduation. They do have options on how to 
complete that obligation. Officers can serve on active duty for three years then join the 
IRR with no further obligation, or affiliate with the MMR SELRES, the MMIRRG, or a 
combination of the two to satisfy their eight-year commitment. 
The second TSA is the NAVCRUIT 1131/4. Officers commissioned under the 
direct commissioning program also assume an eight-year obligation. They too have 
options either to serve as a SELRES for two years followed by six years in the IRR with 
no additional participation, or for six years in the MMIRRG with the final two years in 
the IRR with no additional participation. The final TSA is known as the Ready Reserve 
Service Agreement (NAVPERS 1200/1). Officers already in the MMR Program who 
complete their initial eight-year obligation must execute a Ready Reserve Service 
Agreement to continue to serve in the MMR, either as a SELRES or MMIRRG. 
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Additionally, Midshipman Program participants also have requirements to fulfill 
as specified in MARAD's Service Obligation Contract (SOC). The obligation requires 
the officer to maintain a merchant marine license for six years following graduation, and 
to serve eight years in one of the Armed Service options as previously discussed. 
4. MMR Program Requirements 
In order to meet their obligation requirements and stay active in the MMR 
Program, each officer must fulfill certain requirements. Those requirements are: 
• Maintain an active USCG unlimited tonnage license 
• ■        Perform Annual Training (AT) once a year or obtain a waiver. Priorities 
for ATs are: Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping 
(STCW), maintaining seafaring skills to be a mariner, and expanding your 
qualifications 
• Submit an annual report for each calendar year by 01 March 
• Obtain a Navy physical at least Once within every five-year period 
• Notify the MMR office of any change in status such as address/contact 
information, marital or dependent status, and physical condition that could 
limit performance of reserve obligation 
• Respond to all correspondence and regularly check the MMR office's 
web-side. (MMR program brief 2001) 
5. Program and Command Responsibilities 
There are several commands involved in the administration and operation of the 
MMR Program. Their primary responsibilities and roles are as follows: 
a.        Director, Strategic Sealift Division (N42) of the Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Logistics (OPNAVN4) 
The program sponsor, OPNAV N42, provides policy and planning 
direction for the program, validates and funds billet requirements, and supports 
budgeting, personnel, and logistics requirements. This command also sets the program's 
training objectives and assesses program progress in achieving those objectives. 
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b. Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) 
CNET administers the MMR, USNR Midshipman Program. Those duties 
include functions such as processing applications for the Midshipman Program and 
processing commissions for Midshipman Program and Direct Commission applicants. 
CNET also maintains the Departments of Naval Science at the various maritime schools. 
c. Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force (CNSRF) (N14) 
CNSRF (N14) is the MMR Program Manager. Located in New Orleans, 
this office serves as the point of contact for all MMIRRG Officers. N14 assigns training 
for the MMIRRG as needed and assigns contributory support as requested by active duty 
commands. The office coordinates and performs numerous reserve and administrative 
functions for the MMIRRG. CNSRF (N14) is responsible for maintaining the MMIRRG 
database that tracks and monitors the training accomplished and the performance of 
MMIRRG Officers. Also, they monitor the fulfillment of Training and Service 
Agreements for officers who previously participated in the Midshipmen Program, and 
they report the status to MARAD. 
d Commander, Military Sealift Command (NOOR) 
MSC (NOOR) is the program's technical sponsor. MSC assists CNSRF 
(N14) and other commands as appropriate in support of the management and 
administration of the program. They assist in SELRES billet identification and ensure 
that program technical training requirements are met. 
e. Maritime Administration 
MARAD monitors compliance with the MARAD SOC. If an officer is 
noncompliant, they nominate him or her for involuntary active duty (enlisted status). 
They also provide mobilization training to MMROCH SELRES that pertains to MARAD. 
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F.        MMIRRG 
Since MMIRRG officers are responsible for the sea mission for the MMR 
Program, they will be the primary group affected if a dual USMS/MMR Program is 
established in order to crew RRF vessels during a contingency. In order to obtain a basic 
understanding or "as is" picture of the MMIRRG, training, mobilization, and manpower 
issues must be discussed. 
1. Training 
The mission of a MMIRRG Officer is to operate merchant ships as naval and 
military auxiliaries. Because their mission is at sea, these officers must comply with 
training requirements in addition to maintaining an USCG license. Officers receive 
training in naval regulations, naval operations such as amphibious operations and 
underway replenishment, damage control, firefighting, and in maritime-related areas such 
as MARAD's role as National Shipping Authority and MSC operations. Additionally, 
MMIRRG officers receive focused training in various areas depending on their 
designator. Deck Officers require naval tactics, communications, and security 
procedures. Engineering Officers require naval repair and logistics operations training, 
and Communication Officers require training in naval communications and security 
procedures. 
One type of training requirement or qualification that has recently become an 
issue for the MMIRRG is Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping 
(STCW). The purpose of STCW is to ensure safer seas, conserve the marine 
environment, and help improve the competitiveness of the U.S. Maritime Industry. 
STCW is required for all present and future mariners to sail (on commercial vessels) 
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across the boundary lines of the United States into International Waters. (MMR 
Newsletter 2000) STCW can be obtained by taking USCG courses or through 
demonstration of skills before a Designated Examiner. 
Although having a STCW qualification is not required be in the MMIRRG, these 
officers are encouraged and provided AT opportunities to attend the required courses 
needed to obtain a STCW qualification. (McFadden e-mail 2001) STCW has an impact 
not only on MMIRRG officers, but also on every licensed and unlicensed mariner who 
sails in international waters. This impact, and an in-depth discussion of STCW, will be 
provided in section H of this chapter. 
2. Mobilization 
In the event of a contingency or national emergency, the mobilization policy for 
MMIRRG Officers is dependent on their status. Decisions as to what officers are 
mobilized and what billets they would fill have to be decided at the time of mobilization 
since MMIRRG officers do not belong to Reserve Units and have no billet description or 
assignment. There are two categories: afloat and ashore. The policy for mobilization is: 
Afloat: MMIRRG officers employed in a licensed position at sea aboard a 
United States flag vessel or a foreign flag vessel under "effective United 
States control" (EUSC), or between assignments, will be mobilized only if 
there is an urgent and specific need for their services. Their intended role 
is to serve aboard United States merchant ships in a civilian status. As a 
result of their naval training, these officers will be qualified to serve as 
naval liaison officers for their own vessels whenever naval and merchant 
ships interact. 
Ashore: MMIRRG officers not serving at sea on mobilization day may be 
mobilized to Navy commands as required to fulfill national emergency 
requirements. (MMR Handbook 2000) 
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3. MMIRRG Population 
As of 15 March 2001, there were over 2300 Officers in the MMIRRG. Table 1 
shows a breakdown of qualified Deck Officers by Navy rank and highest USCG license 
qualification. Table 2 provides the same thing for Engineering Officers and Table 3 for 
Radio Officers. There is currently no goal or required number of each rank, designator, 
or USCG license in the MMIRRG program. The total number of MMIRRG officers 
results from the number of affiliations from the various sources and by the number of 
participants that remain in the program after their eight-year commitment. There is no 
minimum or maximum number of program participants. Additionally, there is a rough 
but not a direct relationship to a member's rank and his or her USCG license/highest 
merchant mariner qualification. 
It should be noted that actual program numbers fluctuate, especially when a 
USMMA class graduates. It is also important to understand the general makeup of this 
program and where these officers are employed because their status determines 
mobilization actions as well as their potential availability for service on board RRF 
vessels, whether as civilians or in their military capacity. Over 80 percent of MMIRRG 
officers are either Third Mates or Third Assistants, the most junior officer rank. Of these 
approximately 1900 officers, only 22 percent or 418 officers are employed at sea. Also, 
approximately 30 percent of all MMIRRG officers are employed afloat, 14 percent are 
employed ashore in the maritime industry, 15 percent are employed in a non-maritime 
industry and the status of 37 percent was unknown. (MMR Newsletter, 1999) 
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Master Chief Mate 2nd Mate 3rd Mate 
Ensign 2 1 4 267 
LTJG 5 4 9 234 
LT 43 37 44 343 
LCDR 43 16 11 46 
CDR 37 10 4 19 
CAPT 30 2 0 2 
TOTALS 160 70 72 911 




Assistant 2nd Assistant 3rd Assistant 
Ensign 0 1 6 225 
LTJG 2 3 7 249 
LT 18 23 43 384 
LCDR 12 11 9 66 
CDR 16 4 3 15 
CAPT 5 0 0 1 
TOTALS 53 42 68 940 










Table 3. Breakdown of MMIRRG Qualified Radio Officers by Rank and License. 
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G.       UNITED STATES MARITIME SERVICE (USMS) 
Section 1306 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provides the legal authority to 
establish a Unites States Maritime Service. Section 1306 states: 
(a) Establishment and maintenance. The Secretary [of Transportation] 
may establish and maintain a voluntary organization for the training of 
citizens of the United States to serve on Merchant Marine vessels of the 
United States to be known as the United States Maritime Service. 
(b) Enrollment; compensation; course of study and periods of 
training; uniforms. The Secretary may determine the number of 
individuals to be enrolled for training and reserve purposes in such 
service, to fix the rates of pay and allowances of such individuals without 
regard to provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 
5, United States Code (relating to classification and General Schedule pay 
rates), to prescribe the uniform of such service and the rules governing the 
wearing and fumshing of such uniform. 
(c) Ranks, grades, and ratings same as for United States Coast Guard. 
The ranks, grades, and ratings for personnel of the United States Maritime 
Service shall be the same as... for the personnel of the United States Coast 
Guard." 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt first established the USMS in 1938 in order to 
train the men and women needed to operate the 5000 government cargo ships used in 
World War II. The Coast Guard initially controlled the USMS Program but later 
transferred control to the Navy. In 1938, 37 recruiting offices were established 
throughout the U.S, with several being located next to Navy or Coast Guard Recruiting 
Offices. Many of the men and women who initially tried to join the Navy were sent to 
the USMS by those same Navy or Coast Guard recruiters who stated, "That's where your 
service is needed." (USMM, 2000) This was done because the demand for mariners to 
crew the new Liberty ships at that time far exceeded the needs for additional personnel in 
the Navy. (Seiberlich, 2001) 
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In addition to the recruiting offices that were established, an extensive training 
program and infrastructure was created. Over 250,000 recruits were trained as mariners, 
both licensed and unlicensed, for the war. (USMM, 2000) Over ten basic and advanced 
training sites were built throughout the U.S., the largest being the base at Sheepshead 
Bay, New York. 
The USMS was officially disbanded in 1954 but the law still allows MARAD to 
reestablish the USMS at any time. Despite being disestablished, midshipmen and faculty 
of the US Merchant Marine Academy are enrolled in the USMS, though this enrolment 
generally is viewed as being figurative. For example, the superintendent of USMMA 
holds the rank of Rear Admiral USMS) and several instructors hold the rank of Captain 
(USMS). Also, an important historical note needs to be mentioned since the 
reestablishment of a USMS is being discussed. The USMS was a uniformed, official 
U.S. Government organization, yet its participants did not receive veteran status, while 
other organizations (some contracted), such as the WASPs, did. If the USMS is used, 
issues such as veteran status will need to be addressed to prevent the bitterness that some 
USMS members still feel today. (USMM 2000) 
The law provides MARAD great flexibility as to how a USMS program could be 
developed to serve as a backup mariner pool for contingency crewing. However, it is 
difficult to copy how the USMS was used during WWII since modern day use would be 
different (supplementary instead of a primary manning pool) and the draft was in effect 
during that time period as well. 
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H.       CURRENT INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS AFFECTING CREATION 
OF A DUAL OR STAND-ALONE USMS POOL 
Using the USMS concept is just one of several ways to help accomplish "assured 
access" to mariners for crewing RRF vessels during a contingency. There are several 
other initiatives, studies, and proposals currently being pursued that, if implemented, 
could help accomplish "assured access" as well. Also, some of these initiatives could 
significantly impact how a stand-alone or dual USMS/MMR program is established, or if 
either program needs to be established at all. It is therefore important to know what these 
initiatives are and to understand their potential impact on the creation of a stand-alone 
USMS program or a dual USMS/MMR program. 
1.        STCW 
STCW stands for Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for 
Seafarers. STCW first came into being in July 1978 when the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), because of the lack of international standards, wrote and adopted the 
original STCW requirements now referred to as STCW 78. (MEBA 2001) The U.S. 
didn't start to issue STCW 78 endorsements until 1995. Due to several high profile 
maritime casualties, a review of STCW 78 was initiated in 1992. By 1995, STCW 78 
was significantly revised to incorporate "added significant requirements for formal 
training as well as requirements for assessments of a mariner's practical skills through 
demonstrations of competence." (USCG 2000) 
STCW 95 entered into force on February 1,1997. The U.S. has a five-year 
implementation period that expires January 31,2002. Beginning on February 1, 2002, all 
seafarers and ship companies must be in full compliance with STCW 95. (USCG-1 2000) 
The date of February 1, 2002 is very significant because mariners holding STCW 78 
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endorsements can continue to sail only up to this date. Afterwards, STCW 95 
endorsements will be the only ones recognized by the USCG. Since the February 2002 
date is quickly approaching, most discussions, including this thesis, focus on the impact 
of, and requirements for, STCW 95, not STCW 78. 
STCW 95 is primarily a document that regulates international shipping crews; 
therefore, it does not apply to U.S. mariners sailing in domestic waters. STCW 95 could 
have a major impact on mariners used to crew RRF vessels because the RRF mission 
requires sailing in international waters. However, although it is MARAD policy to have 
mariners crewing RRF vessels to have their STCW qualifications, the STCW convention 
excludes government vessels. 
STCW 95 is applicable to almost every mariner who sails on board a RRF ship. 
USCG Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No.6-00 states: 
The only mariners required to hold an STCW form are the master and 
chief engineer, deck and engineering officers in charge of watches, rating 
forming parts of those watches, personnel who are serving in positions 
requiring proficiency in survival craft, and certain personnel with duties 
relating to radio operations. Other mariners, typically members of the 
steward's department and day-working deck and engineering personnel, 
are not required to hold the STCW form. 
a.        STCW 95 Training and USMS Pool Impact 
Licensed and unlicensed mariners are required to complete various 
training to obtain their STCW 95 endorsement. While some training, like Advanced 
Firefighting, Basic Safety Training (BST), and Survival Craft and Rescue Boat Training 
is required for most seafarers, other training depends on the type and configuration of the 
vessel, and the specific classification or category of the individual mariner (e.g., Deck or 
Engineering, licensed or unlicensed, special billet designation like medical care 
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provider). If a stand-alone USMS or dual USMS/MMR pool is created, the STCW 95 
training requirements should be incorporated into the program's comprehensive training 
plan. 
STCW 95 could have an impact on the availability of the non-actively 
sailing or domestic water sailing mariner pool. Those individuals who were relied upon 
to crew RRF vessels during Desert Shield/Storm will probably not have their STCW 95 
endorsements needed for the next contingency. This also applies to mariners who have 
retired or stopped actively sailing since the war up to the end of 2001. Mariners who 
actively sail after February 2002 will have the required STCW 95 endorsements and 
therefore would technically be qualified to sail on RRF vessels. Since this is the target 
group to form a stand-alone USMS pool, STCW 95 impacts which mariners are targeted 
for participation in the program, the incentives needed to attract these individuals, 
training programs, and the overall program cost. 
2. National   Defense   Transportation   Association   (NDTA)   Manning 
Subcommittee 
The NDTA Military Sealift Committee formed a subcommittee on May 11,1999 
to "Assess our Nation's ability to meet the crewing demand required to support a 
National Sealift Mobilization." (NDTA 2001) The subcommittee established a 
mobilization crewing base from Desert Shield/Storm in 1990, and then determined the 
impact of the changes from that time on the mobilization crewing base needed to support 
a mobilization in 2002 and beyond. Major issues such as a shrinking U.S. flag fleet, new 
STCW training requirements, and a different social and economic environment were 
addressed. The subcommittee concluded, "there is a crewing issue." (NDTA 2001) The 
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subcommittee also proposed several courses of action to help ensure National 
Mobilization needs can be met. Those resolutions and their status include: 
a. Union Pooling Agreement 
A union pooling agreement was proposed to enable a union to obtain 
mariners from another union if they cannot fill a RRF crew position from their 
membership. The unions have agreed to support pooling. 
b. Labor Rate Adjustments 
The committee recommended standardizing the FSS and RRF labor rates 
for ROS vessels to prevent mariners from switching from FSS vessels with lower rates to 
RRF vessels with higher rates. This recommendation was adopted, however the LMSR 
rates that are lower have yet to be raised. Also, it was recommended to raise crew labor 
rates in general to be more competitive. Labor rates have increased since the 
recommendation. 
c. Increases to the Licensed Pool 
To increase the licensed mariner pool, the NDTA recommended that 
MARAD no longer give blanket waivers to the at-sea obligation to USMMA or SIP 
recipients. MARAD agreed and waivers are now considered on a case-by-case basis. 
This action should result in more graduates taking at-sea positions. Additionally, a linked 
recommendation to prevent granting waivers is to place graduates in a queue if there are 
not a sufficient number of sea going billets at graduation time. Graduates would join this 
"pool" and serve as a Junior Third on a designated ship until a permanent position 
becomes available. At that time, the graduate would join a union and take the job. 
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d. Increase to Unlicensed Pool 
The subcommittee recommended the establishment of a 200-billet 
apprentice program for entry level ABs. It is not in place yet but MARAD and one labor 
union are currently working through some Department of Labor regulations to implement 
this program. MARAD supports this program. 
e. Counteract STCW Impact 
The merchant mariners that sail on the Great Lakes, known as "Lakers," 
do not need to be STCW qualified. These Lakers played an important role in helping to 
achieve full manning on REP vessels during Desert Shield/Storm. With STCW taking 
full effect in February 2002, this valuable mariner source may not be available for future 
contingencies. The NDTA has suggested paying each Laker an incentive bonus to obtain 
an STCW qualification. Also, the subcommittee recommended the development of a 
long-range STCW training plan targeting shore side personnel. Similar to the Lakers 
recommendation, the shoreside program would use incentives to encourage this pool of 
mariners to obtain their STCW qualification and therefore potentially be available for a 
mobilization. 
/ Addition of Masters to RRFROS Crews 
A RRF ROS crew does not have a Master billet. The NDTA 
recommended adding a Master to the RRF ROS crews similar to that on MSC's FSS and 
LMSR vessels. Besides creating a new full-time position on these RRF vessels, the 
measure would ensure the person in charge is available and familiar with the ship from 
the start of an activation. 
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3. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for MMR Officer Access 
A MOU is currently being developed between the Navy, on behalf of DoD, and 
MARAD, on behalf of DOT. This MOU would allow MMR officers to be 
recalled/mobilized (in their military capacity) to supplement crewing U.S. Government 
vessels during a national emergency as a last resort. The MOU describes MMR 
mobilization responsibilities, procedures, and principles. Specifics of the MOU cannot 
be provided here, because the MOU is still in draft form and that was part of the 
agreement made to obtain this document. However, if this agreement is put into effect, it 
could negate the need for or benefits achieved from the development of a dual 
USMS/MMR Program. 
4. MMR Program Staff Study 
OPNAV N42 is currently conducting a staff study of the MMR Program as part of 
the Merchant Marine Manning Integrated Process Team established in 14 April 2000. A 
complete program review is being conducted with the major areas of emphasis being: 
availability of MMR members for emergency manning, desired skills, and mobilization 
billets. (MMMIPT 2000) Completion of the study is on hold until final resolution is 
reached on the MOU mentioned in the previous section. (McFadden 2001) 
5. MARAD Mariner Survey 
MARAD has asked the Bureau of Transportation Statistics to conduct a survey 
from a statistical sampling of the mariner pool from the Coast Guard database. This 
survey sampling will help determine the probability of mariner availability, their 
willingness to meet contingency crewing requirements, training background, 
completion/adherence to STCW 95, current sailing employment, and to verify contact 
information about them in the USCG's database/records. Estimated completion date for 
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the survey is July 2001. Survey results may or may not indicate that there are a sufficient 
number of mariners available with the correct ratings/positions and skills needed during a 
contingency. Unfavorable survey results could result in the pursuit or enactment of some 
of the various actions previously discussed, just as favorable results may result in no 
action being taken. This will establish a good benchmark on mariner availability and 
willingness to support sealift ships in time of emergency. 
6.        Exercise BREAKOUT 01 
MARAD's Office of Ship Operation conducted BREAKOUT 01 from 16-27 April 
2001. This exercise simulated the simultaneous activation of all RRF vessels. A Quick- 
Look Report was issued 4 May 2001 with a detailed report to be issued 26 May 2001. 
(Lockland, 2001) 
A total of 63 ships was available for activation at the start of the exercise. 
MARAD notified the various Ship Managers who then contacted the labor unions to 
obtain qualified mariners not sailing and available for this exercise. Names of 1570 
mariners were provided for the 63 ships, resulting in 100 percent manning and all ships 
manned within their required activation times. MARAD used the crew lists to verify that 
mariners were indeed "ready, willing and able" to sail on their assigned RRF ship. 
(Lockland, 2001) Over 1200 phone calls were made resulting in 32 percent of the 
mariners directly contacted. However, of the information on the mariners provided, the 
contact phone numbers had numerous omissions. In the case of MARAD's Western 
Region, over 25 percent of the mariners that MARAD attempted to contact had incorrect 
or disconnected phone numbers. (Blake, 2001) Therefore, while the crew lists were 
received in a timely manner and resulted in 100 percent manning, the significant problem 
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of incorrect contact phone numbers makes it is difficult to truly state one way or another 
if there would be a crewing shortage had this been a genuine mobilization. 
I. CHAPTER SUMARY 
In this chapter, an overview of strategic sealift was provided. This included a 
description of the U.S. government vessels and commercial ships used to move material, 
and the various programs the government uses to secure these assets. It also provided 
background information on the RRF, the MMR Program, and the USMS. Finally, it 
presented the current initiatives and proposals that could affect the creation of a dual or 
stand-alone USMS program and also the U.S. Merchant Marine in general. It is 
important to have a basic understanding on how strategic sealift is structured and operates 
before a new concept like the USMS can be discussed or developed. 
The next chapter contains the analysis of the data obtained from the structured 
interviews. The results will then be used to determine which approach should be taken in 
the development of a backup pool of mariners, and how these new program(s) should be 
designed. 
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III.    METHODOLOGY 
A.       DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
A literature review and informal interviews were used to obtain the background 
information for this thesis. Fourteen structured interviews were used to collect the data to 
answer the research questions. Of the 14, 12 were done via phone, and two in person. 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. A fifteenth interview was 
conducted with an individual representing ship managers participating in the VISA 
program. Since the purpose of the interview was specifically to obtain perspective from 
that segment of the maritime industry on the development of an USMS backup mariner 
pool, a structured interview was not conducted. 
Interviewees were selected based on their expertise in the subject and also to 
ensure adequate representation from each of the major stakeholders within the maritime 
industry that would impact, or be impacted, by the creation of a program based on the 
USMS concept. The interviewee selection process started with Captain Ron McFadden 
of OPNAV N42 and Mr. Kevin Tokarski of MARAD providing the names of three to 
four individuals who were the initial people contacted and interviewed. They were 
asked, or suggested on their own, additional people to interview who were 
knowledgeable on the subject and/or could represent (speak for) a given organization or 
segment of the industry. Most of the people interviewed were recommended by several 
individuals as key people whose opinions should be included in this thesis. 
The information and/or quotes obtained from the individuals interviewed for this 
thesis will not be linked to a given individual, however, in order to put the source of the 
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data in the proper context, it is important to represent their backgrounds, current or past 
positions, and what segments of the industry they represent. It is also important to 
discuss how representative these individuals are of their respective organizations. The 
interviewees represented the following segments of the maritime industry: 
RRF Ship Managers: Individuals from two of the ship managers out of a 
possible nine were interviewed. Both are highly respected individuals who hold senior 
positions in their companies. They are both intimately familiar with the subject and are 
good representatives for all RRF ship managers. 
Licensed Unions: Two individuals, one representing the International 
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots (MMP) and one representing the American 
Maritime Officers (AMO), were interviewed. There are three unions that provide 
licensed mariners for RRF vessels, making the inputs from these individuals highly 
representative of this community. 
Unlicensed Unions: One senior official from the Seafarers International Union 
(SIU) was interviewed. The SIU is the major provider of unlicensed mariners for RRF 
vessels. The inputs from this individual were highly representative of the views of his 
company and all unlicensed unions. 
OPNAV N42: One current senior military officer at OPNAV N42 and two senior 
military officers who previously served there were interviewed. 
MARAD: Three of the individuals interviewed were current MARAD 
employees. One is a senior official in the National Security Affairs Division that is 
responsible for the RRF Program, one is an employee at MARAD's Western Regional 
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Office, and one is MARAD's liaison with USTRANSCOM on the RRF Program. Their 
inputs are representative of the various levels of involvement in this issue. 
MSC: A senior military officer who provides technical expertise and guidance 
for the MMR Program was interviewed. Also, one of the individuals interviewed was a 
Commanding Officer of a MSC reserve unit. The inputs received from both individuals 
were their personal perspectives and were not necessarily representative of MSC 
leadership. 
USTRANSCOM: One individual interviewed was a member of 
USTRANSCOM's Strategic Sealift Division. His views may or may not represent senior 
leadership ofthat organization. 
MMR Program: The current MMR Program Manager was interviewed. Also, 
two individuals were current MMR members and three individuals who had retired from 
the MMR were interviewed. 
USMMA/USMS: One individual interviewed was an instructor from the 
USMMA who also holds the rank of Captain in the USMS. This individual was chosen 
based on his position at the USMMA and for his extensive knowledge and experience 
with the MMR Program. 
NDTA Manning Subcommittee Members: Four of the individuals interviewed 
are involved in a high-level subcommittee that was assigned to "Assess our Nation's 
ability to meet the crewing demand required to support a National Sealift Mobilization." 
Commercial Ship Managers/VISA Program: One individual was interviewed 
from a commercial ship manager company that manages ships solely in the VISA 
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program and not in the RRF Program. There is a total of 47 ship managers involved in 
the VISA program. The individual interviewed was highly knowledgeable, well known, 
and respected. His inputs were representative of VISA program participants. 
It is important to note that if one added the total number of individuals discussed 
in the eleven categories listed above, the number is far greater than the total number of 
people interviewed (15). This is because almost every individual is or has been involved 
in more than category. That was a major benefit for this research because almost all of 
the individuals interviewed understood the issues from both the military and commercial 
perspectives. 
B.        INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS 
The researcher used a structured interview approach preceded by contacting each 
prospective interviewee by phone to describe the purpose of the thesis and to request an 
interview. No one declined to be interviewed. Once contacted, each interviewee was 
provided with the interview protocol that contained more specific information on the 
purpose of the thesis and the basic research questions and format that would be followed. 
Appendix C contains the interview protocol that, was provided. During the actual 
interview, the interview protocol in Appendix D was used. The interview protocol in 
Appendix D was not provided because it contained the probe questions and other specific 
questions that could have influenced the interviewee's input. 
The interview protocol followed the guidance provided in Rubin and Rubin 
(1995) that suggested using open-ended questions and when necessary, and follow-on 
probe questions to prompt the interviewee or clarify answers. Each interviewee was 
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taken through the question with reference to the development of a stand-alone pool 
followed by the same question for the development of a dual USMS/MMR Program. 
C.        DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis was done on over 200 pages of transcribed interviews that resulted 
from the 14 interviews. The process of "coding" was used to group the interviewees' 
responses into categories. (Rubin and Rubin, 1995) The responses were grouped 
accordingly to how the interviewees answered the primary and secondary thesis questions 
for both the development of a stand-alone USMS Program and a dual USMS/MMR 
Program. Chapter IV describes the majority opinion/input for a given question along 
with supporting quotes. Several minority opinions for each question are provided as 
well. 
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IV.    ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The contents of the structured interviews were analyzed to answer the primary 
research question and the seven secondary research questions. Each secondary research 
question was asked as it applied to a stand-alone USMS Program and to a dual 
USMS/MMR Program. This chapter presents the majority opinions/inputs for each 
question. Several minority opinions for each question are provided as well. The 
information is grouped by the two USMS options, not by research question. 
Additionally, each interviewee was assigned a number (e.g., Interviewee One) to prevent 
association of any information or quote with a specific individual. 
B. STAND-ALONE PROGRAM 
1. What are the Major Advantages? 
The interviewees suggested several advantages for the RRF and the maritime 
industry in the establishment of an USMS stand-alone pool. One of the major advantages 
offered was that a stand-alone pool could provide a back-up pool of experienced mariners 
available to crew RRF vessels. This pool could provide quick and guaranteed access to 
qualified mariners. It could also be designed to target specific rates where shortages 
exist, or skill sets unique to RRF vessels. The other major advantage is that this pool 
could increase the size of the non-sailing pool of mariners available for contingency 
crewing by providing an incentive (training and monetary) for mariners to keep their 
licenses current. The pool could help counteract the impact that STCW 95 requirements 




I see it as filling a gap that is becoming more and more apparent. I know 
they are doing manning studies...it is a big concern here at 
TRANSCOM...does MARAD have the ability to man the organic lift? 
Something has to be done sooner instead of later. It is an advantage 
because at least it is another option to take. It may not be the preferred 
option...more growth in the current maritime industry sailing U.S. flag 
ships.. .but as a backup it is a good alternative worth pursuing and having 
it on the shelf to activate. 
Interviewee One: 
Just guaranteed access to mariners that we are going to need in some kind 
of contingency. In particular the ability to contact people quickly because 
there are really two different issues. One is do we have the right number of 
mariners and number two is how fast can we get them. 
Interviewee Eleven believed this program could address the decrease in the 
availability of non-sailing mariners since the Persian Gulf War because of STC W 95 
requirements: 
First of all... we have the pool that is here today that will change effective 
February 2002 with the last implementation phase of STCWf. .my concern 
is... in general... when you go back to the Persian Gulf War, which I went 
through...but with more ships operating in the fleet...we were able to 
draw on the retiree pool who went to sea and supported us. The problem 
coming in February 2002...that people like that, that pool that is not 
sailing today.. .is basically gone from the standpoint that none of them will 
be STCW trained...and basically it takes a lot of hours of training. Where 
is the incentive for these mariners to be trained, taking into account their 
time and their costs. That is the issue...whether you call it a stand-alone 
pool or what you call it...we also drew on the Lakers the last time...and 
the Lakers will not be STCW trained either. How are we going to have 
the individuals trained to make them available to just equalize the ability 
and capability that we had during the Gulf War that we are losing...How 
do we get many of those in that so-called pool STCW trained and 
available to serve if the bell rings? 
Interviewee Eleven went on to say: 
...If you can get them trained so they are available, then that does a great 
service because today...as far as February 2002, there are going to be 
46 
many ofthose people that are not going to renew their licenses, which they 
could automatically do in the past...or if they do...won't have the 
credentials to sail without a waiver. 
Other comments emphasized the advantages of the civilian aspect of a stand-alone 
pool. Since the USMS it is a civilian program, there is no Navy influence or confusion of 
roles when compared to a dual USMS/MMR program. Some interviewees also felt a 
stand-alone program could provide an excellent "home" for individuals who had finished 
their USNR/MMR obligation, were no longer qualified to be in the MMR, or did not 
want to deal with the regulations and structure associated with the Naval Reserve. 
Interviewee Five: 
The biggest advantage I see is that there wouldn't be a confusion of 
roles...the USMS would be there for providing civilian manpower in an 
emergency. The problem we have with the MMR is that they are first and 
foremost naval reservists. Naval personnel do not crew the ships we have 
in the RRF or in the MSC billets and...there would be a clear distinction 
of roles where the USMS is simple a reserve pool of commercial 
mariners...civilian in nature...civilian in purpose and they would simply 
be there to fill the shortfalls that may exist in activating our organic ships. 
That is the principal advantage. 
Interviewee Two: 
I think you can keep people who came in and did their eight years in the 
MMR; those are the guys to attract to stay in the USMS. That would be 
okay because we do not keep enough people actively involved because 
they do not want to deal with the Navy part of it. Plus, to get a retirement 
has a lot of obstacles. In a USMS program, you would not have to worry 
about rank and could stay in the USMS and not worry about promotion or 
the reserve game. 
Interviewees also stated that being able to have unlicensed mariners in a stand- 
alone pool was a key advantage. Other advantages offered include: provides a good 
database on mariners and formalizes the retiree pool, participants are volunteers, and a 
USMS pool could entice non-actively sailing mariners to rejoin the active sailing pool. 
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Only interviewee thirteen stated that he could find no advantages to the establishment of 
a stand-alone USMS program. 
Interviewee Fourteen felt a stand-alone USMS program might stimulate a 
mariner's interest to actively sail: 
One of the other advantages is that if you have people in this pool and they 
are not sailing on a regular basis in the maritime industry and they get 
their feet wet, it might draw them back into the maritime industry as well, 
thereby reducing the shortage 
2.        What are the Major Disadvantages? 
Most of the disadvantages mentioned focused more on the creation of the program 
rather than attributes of the program itself. They could almost be considered obstacles 
instead of disadvantages. The major issue, without a doubt, expressed specifically by 
twelve of the fourteen interviewees, dealt with costs. Most felt the costs could be 
substantial and obtaining funding difficult, depending on how the program was 
specifically designed. Costs for program set up, administration, recruiting, training, 
travel, and benefits for participants were issues offered. The second most frequently 
mentioned disadvantage was that this would be a new program that has never existed 
before, with no current infrastructure within MARAD. 
Interviewee Ten: 
I don't think there are disadvantages from an operational point of view. 
But where you will find a detrimental consideration is the money. There 
is going to have to be some type of incentive to get these people in the 
program. There is going to be some type of administration of the 
program. Now it might be able to be self-administered and use people in 
the program to administer it, but still you have a cost involved. You also 
have a reluctance of some established bureaucracy in Washington, DC to 
see what they think is a rival or additional bureaucracy being established. 
But money is going to be the greatest obstacle. How much it will cost 
depends on how you set it up, but there definitely will be a cost. 
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Interviewee Five: 
The disadvantage of the USMS would be that with the exception of the 
WWII scenario where you had a need for mariners...it wasn't a reserve 
pool of mariners in that concept...they were the main line...we were 
training them and sending them off to sea. This would be the first time an 
identified reserve pool of mariners would have to be 
developed...conceived of...there would have to be a whole training 
regimen developed, which I think we can do...I think it is all 
doable.. .there would be a substantial amount of money. 
Interviewee Thirteen believed that, under no situation, that this program would be 
established because of its tremendous cost: 
Whether I see any advantages...it will not happen because of the cost. I 
think I told you that I was involved in a study about 15 years ago and the 
cost was about 69 million dollars to establish it...and I'm not trying to be 
an obstructionist, I'm just trying to be pragmatic...and where would that 
money come from? 
Interviewee Four 
There is currently no infrastructure in MARAD to handle such a program. 
There is nothing like the Navy reserve training and administrative 
infrastructure such as reserve centers, computer systems, accounting, etc. 
They would all have to be started from scratch from an administrative 
standpoint. There would be some initial confusion as to what role the 
USMS would play. 
Some of the disadvantages stated by three individuals were concerned with union 
perceptions of this program if members are non-union or with potential pay issues. Two 
individuals felt that a stand-alone program could provide a false sense of security with 
regard to contingency crewing. Also, three interviewees were concerned about either the 
qualification level of pool members since they are not actively sailing, or an individual's 
physical qualification since one of the targeted groups is retired mariners. 
Interviewee Fourteen: 
One of the biggest disadvantages is getting regular exposure to maritime 
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vessels...they are going to get out there and not have a clue what to do 
because technology changes every month now. 
Interviewee Seven: 
It may give some false sense of security as to other programs that should 
be looked at in terms of helping the maritime industry... in other words, if 
we run in to it, we have it covered because we have this pool of mariners 
that we can rely upon to go to...so we don't have to go ahead and look at 
tax incentives for the merchant marine. Another disadvantage is you are 
going to possibly have some pay issues. If a USMS guy belongs to a 
different union, there may be some issues there, but those should be 
overcome. 
Interviewee Five: 
The purpose of our program is to keep a viable U.S. Merchant Marine and 
to maintain an adequate number of commercial civilian mariners available 
in the event of a contingency. If we had a reserve program that artificially 
provided that at some significant expense, I'm afraid that it would 
probably jeopardize one of the underpinnings of why we have federal 
assistance programs to support the merchant marine. 
We would probably be reduced to a more artificial structure whereby we 
don't really have any of our real mariners or fewer of our real mariners in 
commercial service...we would rely solely on a so-called reserve pool of 
mariners that are not hands on in the industry. The other down side is 
what I just said...they are not hands on in the industry...they aren't 
actually active seamen perhaps...I think you probably lose something by 
having people that are strictly reservist vice those active in the commercial 
industry. 
3.        What    Incentives    or    Assurances    Are    Needed    for    Affected 
Organizations to Support/Participate in the Program? 
The purpose of this question was to determine the concerns an individual and/or 
his organization had about the creation of a stand-alone program, and based on those 
concerns, what incentives or assurances were needed to achieve buy-in or support. Most 
of answers focused on the status of the individual mariners. Interviewees wanted 
assurances that pool participants were properly trained and qualified to perform the RRF 
mission as well as available and prepared for a short notice activation. 
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Interviewee Eleven agreed with the following statement made by the 
author: 
So one of the assurances is that whomever these people are... it is known 
that they are ready to go to sea.. .they are qualified and their training is up 
to date... so that if you had to call them today they would be ready to go, 
in theory. 
Interviewee Eight: 
One assurance would be is that the person would be available to sail.. .that 
is the main crutch right there...the individual that you identify must be 
available to sail. 
Four individuals stated they did not have concerns or need assurances, but 
supported the program because it contributed to ensuring "assured access" to mariners 
during a contingency. 
Interviewee Seven: 
TRANSCOM is really concerned about guaranteed access. They want to 
make sure they have access to ships and ship's crews. From a 
TRANSCOM point of view, they are interested in organic lift, only. They 
would want another type of option out there. They are building ships, but 
the manning is becoming a bigger issue to the ships out there. I cannot see 
where they would have any objection to having a program that is either 
stand-alone or combined. 
Interviewee Two: 
None. It doesn't change what I do. If you create it, it helps, but it doesn't 
hinder me if you don't. In a way, I can only benefit from it. 
One individual was concerned that this type of program could draw out actively 
sailing, unlicensed mariners, thereby reducing the size of the active pool. Other 
noteworthy answers include: articulate the mission, ensure the USMS program is on 
equal footing and has the same status as any other reserve program, and to formally 
include ship managers in the process. 
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Interviewee Fourteen: 
The only concern that we probably would have is that there are a lot of 
people out there that would like to sail on a part-time basis, but have to 
sail on a full-time basis because there is no such thing as a part-time basis 
for them now.. .the only concern that we would have is that it might draw 
active mariners out of the industry. 
We want people to sail eight months a year and if there is a way for them 
to maintain their licenses without having to do the required sea time...it 
might pull them out of the active pool and put them in another line of 
work. 
Interviewee Ten: 
I think you have to make the USMS reserve on equal footing with any of 
the other reserve programs in terms of pay, retirement benefits...not 
subject to the draft. You have to make sure they can interchange their 
civilian service in USMS with military service because most of them will 
have started out with some sort of reserve obligation... been on active duty 
for a few years...that longevity and retirement benefits must switch back 
and forth. This has to be a very fluid program. And all have dead ends 
because those people will say, "What is in it for me?" 
4. What Incentives are Needed to Entice Individual Mariners to Join 
and Remain in the Program? 
Each interviewee stated that incentives were key in attracting non-actively sailing 
mariners to this program. While merchant mariners as a group can be considered highly 
patriotic, it is unreasonable to expect any individual to join this type of program without 
some type of monetary compensation and/or benefits. Seven interviewees believed that 
mariners would volunteer if they were paid directly or the program paid for them to 
maintain their license, qualifications, and STCW 95 necessary to maintain an active 
license. These type of payments are similar to that received by naval reservists doing 
their annual training. 
When Interviewee One was asked if paying for a mariner's qualifications, license, 
and STCW should be the minimum, he responded: 
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In fact that would be the minimum. An agreement for the stand-alone 
pool should be that once a year you do a minimum of two weeks and we 
pay for your travel, tuition, and whatever the standard is. 
Interviewee Eight: 
Offer them an incentive to keep their qualifications current...something 
like giving them free training...periodic training, or whatever it takes to 
keep their qualifications current at the expense of the government. 
Interviewee Fourteen believed that paying program participants (when they are in 
a training or active USMS status) the same wage rate they typically receive when actively 
sailing under their license would be an excellent incentive to attract mariners to the 
program: 
When they do their reserve duty, they have to be paid at the same rate they 
would be when sailing and holding that rating because that is going to 
attract people. You are not going to be able to give them a cadet rate. 
Would you leave home for seven dollars an hour just to keep a pool 
qualified? 
The other type of incentive mentioned most often was some type of retirement 
program like a pension plan or 401(k). While interviewees believed retirement benefits 
would be a good enticement, five interviewees, although they could envision some type 
of pension plan, believed it must be limited or was a non-starter because of lack of 
funding or resistance to establishing long-range entitlements. 
Interviewee Thirteen: 
The incentives would be the same whether it is a stand-alone or a MMR 
program... the incentives would be some sort of remuneration and then at 
the end some form of retirement benefit that would be accrued to them 
after so many years in this reserve program...or setting up something 
similar to what they have in the MMR.. .after 20 or so years you would be 
entitled to certain benefits based on the amount of time you have 
contributed into it. 
Interviewee Two: 
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They could have a separate program, say a 401(k) with matching funds, 
that is low cost to administer where mariners would earn by actively doing 
it [being in a training or sailing status]. 
Interviewee Nine: 
I could envision one [benefit package or pension program]...but you are 
talking about establishing new entitlements. The Congress really balks at 
establishing new entitlements that must be paid by future Congresses. 
While this may not be a big program, it is another one, and that is how 
they view it. 
The other individual incentive mentioned specifically by four interviewees and 
alluded to when discussing monetary incentives was meaningful training. A viable 
training program with access to courses and, even more importantly, to activated RRF 
vessels was key. 
Interviewee Five provided this comment regarding training: 
But the most important thing is that we have a training regime that is 
meaningful and hits the mark. To whatever extent that we identify a 
mission or a requirement, we develop training that will be effective...to 
the extent that we develop effective training, we will be able to recruit and 
retain people into this thing. .The way I would imagine the USMS to 
work, is that it would be mandatory for some or all of the academy 
graduates.. .but in order to maintain an interest and in order to voluntarily 
keep people in the program beyond their service obligation, I think we 
would have to have meaningful training...if we don't interest the people 
and convey the message that it is important, meaningful, and serves a 
purpose, I'm not sure it will serve a purpose. 
5.        What Are the Training and Qualification Requirements? 
Two specific questions were used to obtain answers for this research question. 
The first question asked what training opportunities and frequency the interviewee 
envisioned for USMS pool participants. The second question focused on how the 
interviewee would ensure that USMS members possessed and retained the skills, unique 
or otherwise, associated with operating RRF vessels. In terms of training opportunities 
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and frequency, every interviewee discussed the need for pool participants to train on 
ships, with the majority ofthat time spent underway. While most interviewees felt the 
training should be performed on RRF vessels, three others also mentioned the same type 
of training could be accomplished on commercial ships. The frequency of this training 
ranged from a high of four two-week periods per year to a minimum of two weeks a year. 
Two weeks per year, which is same time period a naval reservist performs per year on 
AT, was the most common answer. 
Interviewee Five had the following views on the amount and type of training: 
I think something similar to what we have in the reserves now. I think the 
two-week annual training and the monthly training is a tried and true 
formula, but I think the thing we need to do is to connect them to the 
ships.. .if we are talking about a USMS that is serving on MARAD's RRF 
ships or MSC's ships...I think we need to develop annual and monthly 
training that somehow allows them to obtain a familiarity with some of 
our platforms. It would be nice for members in the Charleston area.. .that 
the RRF ships in Charleston be the training platform. You try to tie their 
training to the ships in their local area if feasible. We are also going to be 
limited...we are not going to be taking ships out on weekends to train 
these guys...but I think if can develop training that is coordinated with 
activations, I think that will help us and provide meaningful training. The 
training should be tied directly to the programs that we expect these 
people to participate in... and much ofthat can be from the administrative 
side.. .that can be a little bit dry but there is a lot from the administrative 
side of what happens when you activate a ship and what the roles and 
responsibilities are and how they fold in and interact with the rest of the 
MSC operation. 
Interviewee Fourteen 
I would think they would have to go four times a year...every quarter 
would probably work...and it would have to be for two weeks...to put 
them on a ship for a weekend that doesn't go anywhere...there is no 
benefit to it. You have to go to a point A or point B and stand watches 
and do what is required.. .plus they need that to keep their license in force 
anyway...you have to maintain a certain amount of recency sea time to 
keep your license good now. 
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Interviewee Six 
The best place to use them with whatever training period you come up 
with is on RRF vessels. MARAD is the keeper of the ships and USMS is 
within MARAD, so there is no problem of getting their own people on 
board to train them. And that is where you want them to get the training 
any way... learn where the light switches are and how the cargo gear goes 
up and down, and the ramp, etc...so we are not screwing with them at the 
last minute to figure out if they know how to do it. 
Interviewees stated that the necessary requirements for a mariner to maintain their 
license, including STCW 95, should be the minimum training requirements. Those 
requirements are already established and would only have to be incorporated into a 
comprehensive training plan. In addition, specific RRF requirements such as damage 
control and bridge training need to be incorporated into the training plan. In terms of the 
unique skill or qualifications unique to certain RRF vessels such as operating a steam 
plant or certain cargo handling gear, steam was the biggest concern to the interviewees. 
Most expressed the need to have a sufficient number of mariners in this pool with steam 
experience. Maintaining this level of expertise also required mariners to practice this 
skill at sea. 
Interviewee Seven: 
As far as the cargo handling, you can do it pier side.. .you can set up some 
AT or for the USMS just have them come out and use the cargo gear. And 
we do that with the Cargo Handling Battalions (CHBs) mainly on the 
crane ships. Same could be done with the breakbulks...it comes down to 
costs...how much bang for the buck...there will have to be some funding 
with those in the ROS and there would need to be some consideration with 
the ship managers that would have to support those operations. 
Interviewee Thirteen 
Right now, the STCW training specifies all the training you are going to 
require. The training that is unique to the DoD or RRF vessels is training 
that MARAD or DoD would have to pay for...right now the union pays 
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for that...for example we pay for small arms training, damage control 
training, and unique bridge team management, which you don't find on 
any commercial vessels. 
Interviewee Eleven 
I don't know if you can ensure that you have all the exact training you 
need. You have to have the requirements of STCW, small arms, 
firefighting training and things ofthat nature. There are fewer people with 
steam...it would be nice for the RRF since there is a lot of steam 
ships...the ROROs are diesel but the main ones are mainly steam. It 
would be good to get some of the steam operators because most of your 
newer ships are diesel in your present fleet...you don't have many of the 
steam...it would be nice to provide incentives to encourage the steam 
people to join the pool. 
6.        What Are the Sign Up and Obligation Requirements for Members 
Participating in the Program? 
The overwhelming response given by nine interviewees was a five-year obligation 
period. Five years coincides with the renewal for a mariner's license and also the 
periodicity for a physical. Two interviewees suggested having a bonus tied to the length 
of obligation or when an individual reobligates. 
Interviewee Seven: 
Five years seems like a good time.. .it seems that is the way that things are 
typically in the government.. .that is a five-year program. If anyone wants 
to come in...and they can come in at any time...they would sign up for a 
five-year program.. .and they can renew after five years. If the stand-alone 
program is voluntary, a five-year obligation at least provides a planning 
tool... if you get someone only signed up for a couple of years... it is hard 
to count on them.. .administratively it will be a burden as well. 
Interviewee Eleven: 
I would say that if you are going to go into that pool, that means they have 
to provide training for you...that is five years...and then you need to be 
recertified at the end of five years anyway. So you might as well have the 
sign up and obligation for five years. 
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Interviewee Four suggested paying bonuses based on the length of obligation: 
That makes sense [five years and tie it to their license]. I would tier it. If I 
was to sit down with a blank sheet of paper...if you obligate for three 
years you get 3000, if you obligate for five years, you get 6500 dollars, if 
seven years then 10,000 dollars (numbers are for example). The longer 
they obligate for, the greater the financial incentive. You will need to 
have some method to ensure that their license and physical health is kept 
up so that they could actually perform the job if called upon. 
Two of the interviewees expressed concerns about enforcement of a given 
obligation made by a civilian mariner. If an individual signs up for a given period, then 
decides they no longer want to participate in the program or will not take a position on a 
RRF vessel during a contingency, what legal right does the government have to force that 
individual to comply with the agreement they signed? 
Interviewee One: 
The question then becomes if you have some type of emergency breakout 
and you need these people and someone says no. If they are USNR, we 
know exactly what we can do. Can the USMS do the same thing? 
Interviewee Thirteen: 
You can't.. .how are you going to require a guy to sign up for it.. .a guy is 
either going to want to sign up, then he will sign up for a year, or sign up 
for 60 days.. .1 think you are going down a road that you don't want to go 
down...and then what happens when the guys says after three years "hell 
with you," what are you going to do.. .put the guy in jail? 
7.        What Organization(s) Should Manage the Program? 
In response to what organization(s) should manage a stand-alone USMS program, 
all of the interviewees suggested that either MARAD should do it or should provide 
oversight. Almost all of the individuals felt that if MARAD was to actively manage the 
program, they need more manpower and infrastructure and could not accomplish it with 
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existing resources. MARAD would also need to ensure that adequate expertise/senior 
mariners are involved in the process. 
Interviewee Twelve 
I think that MARAD, under their training office, would have to do it. 
They would certainly have to be funded to do it. Right now, they are 
pretty tight on the people they have there. 
Interviewee Seven 
I think MARAD would be good for that...I don't know how many 
personnel would be involved in doing that.. .but I think MARAD would be 
a choice for that. That is what MARAD...National Security Directive 
28...that is where MARAD is tasked by the White House to ensure there 
is adequate commercial sealift. I think that ties in nicely if we ran this 
program.. .to ensure there are enough mariners to go with that sealift. 
Interviewee Ten: 
I would not have it done by active duty Navy or non-experienced civilian 
mariners. By that I mean people who have actually sailed in command or 
been Chief Mates or Engineers...I am not talking about some guy at 
MARAD or MSC that happened to have graduated from a maritime 
academy 20 years ago and one time had a third mate's license. I'm talking 
about people at least as experienced or qualified as the people they are 
going to be recalling. 
Interviewee Two was the first person to suggest that the shipping companies and 
the unions should manage a stand-alone USMS progranrand that MARAD would 
provide oversight. His reasoning was: 
The shipping companies and unions should [manage the program] with 
oversight. There again, to do the training, pay for the training for the guy 
whose ship and union that he is to go on.. .that is another incentive for the 
union. If this guy is bounced against the Callahan as a MEB A guy, then 
when you pay for the training and his physical, do it at the union 
school... pay them for firefighting so they get a piece of the puzzle. They 
have to keep the guys training Up. The guy who should arrange for the 
training should be the ship manager. We know who they are.. .1 track their 
training...of course I will get a little fee for this...I'm not going to do it 
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for free.. .but it is all part of the contract. I tell Charlie to go to the MEBA 
School...do all your stuff...that gets you (MARAD) out of doing a big 
administrative thing...you just provide oversight. If you set up a big 
organization in MARAD to do this.. .why would you? I am already doing 
it because it is my responsibility when the guy gets to the ship that all of 
his paperwork is up to date. 
After this interview, each subsequent interviewee was specifically asked for their 
thoughts on this idea. 
Interviewee Eleven was concerned about how mariners would be allocated among 
the various ship managers if a shortage of mariners existed: 
I guess if you had us try to do...between us and the unions...identify so 
many bodies...there would be an issue with each union as to how many 
they assign to ship manager X versus ship manager Y...and everybody 
would be short X amount of people or everybody is full. 
Interviewee Five believed that ship managers could contribute to the management 
process: 
I think MARAD would always have to do the administration. I think we 
could have it in the ship manager contract and be tasked with some 
training tasks or facilitating training tasks, but I think to expect the admin 
to be done by the ship managers would be a bad idea. I think you need to 
have a centrally coordinated administration of the program and I think 
having it in assorted ship managers would be dangerous 
Interviewee Seven was a firm believer in less hierarchy and more power for front- 
line decision makers: 
I could see...when we actually get to the point where we have to use this 
program...the more it can be streamlined...the less hierarchy the 
better...that is the whole purpose...to man the ships...the more it can be 
streamlined to get the power out to those in the field, the better.. .set up the 
program through MARAD and MARAD can delegate it down. 
Interviewee Twelve: 
Yes they [ship managers] could...you would have to have a discussion on 
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it but certainly it could be a way to do it. I think how well it would work 
would come out once you start talking to the ship managers. 
Interviewee Fourteen was not in favor of ship manager involvement: 
If you are going to leave it up to the ship managers to manage this 
thing...it will never happen. They are just overwhelmed with what they 
are doing now...it would have to be a separate office within MARAD and 
that would be their primary function...to manage and keep fully funded 
the reserve pool. They would have to act as recruiters and work to find the 
people. The ship managers don't have time...anyone that a ship manager 
recruits for a pool.. .they are going to try to put them on a ship. 
Additionally, Interviewee Fourteen commented that it would be important for 
success of the program to have separate management for licensed and unlicensed 
participants. He stated: 
If you are going to institute this and you are going to be using unlicensed 
mariners...you are going to have to have two different types of people 
running the two different pools...one for the licensed and one for the 
unlicensed...simply because it has traditionally been done that way. They 
are more comfortable with that. Unlicensed people understand their 
concerns and complaints and licensed people understand their concerns 
and complaints. That is why we don't crew a ship from top to bottom. 
8.        What are the Obstacles (Real or Perceived) in Using the USMS 
Concept? 
This research question had two basic purposes. The first purpose was to identify 
the issues that could prevent the establishment of a stand-alone USMS program. The 
second purpose was to try to identify any rules, regulations, procedures, policies, and/or 
laws that would need to be changed or developed to establish this program. Identifying 
these potential obstacles and then properly addressing them in the development phase of 
the program should contribute to the program's successful implementation and ultimate 
acceptance. 
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As was the case when the interviewees were asked for program disadvantages, 
obtaining adequate funding was the primary obstacle provided. One of the reasons 
funding could be an issue relates to another obstacle the interviewees provided; this is a 
new program that has never been tried before. Several interviewees also believed that the 
unions could pose an obstacle to creating this program. However, the majority of 
interviewees believed that these obstacles could be counteracted by having sound 
justification for the need of the program and by involving the unions and ship managers 
in the development of this program. 
Interviewee Five 
The biggest one is the fact that we have never done it before...and the 
cost. I think the cost has been the one I have always heard about 
that...some people have put together some scenarios and the price tag is 
pretty staggering. I think we need to make the mission argument and to 
identify clearly the requirement that we are satisfying...I know of many, 
many good ideas that you could otherwise sell sometimes fall short 
because of funding.. .and that is a potential roadblock in anything we do. 
Interviewee Fourteen: 
Just ourselves...getting everybody to agree is the biggest obstacle you 
have...the people who are in this industry have to support it 100 percent. 
That is the only obstacle you have...you cannot get two maritime entities 
to agree on anything except that there is a shortage. 
Interviewee Nine: 
You must have a very well organized program. You have to call in both 
the operators and the unions...you set them down and say this is what we 
have to do in order to man these ships in a contingency. I have yet seen a 
time where companies will answer up to real needs properly described to 
them, and as long as it doesn't come out of their operating costs... as long 
as it get funded by the government, they will do it. 
For the second aspect of the question that addressed the modification or creation 
of new laws, regulations, etc., the interviewees stated that there would be a need for 
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several actions to make a USMS program work. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and 
Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations were the two specific laws mentioned that 
would need to be modified. The issues that these new or modified laws or protocols need 
to address include: enforcement of program participants' requirements and obligations, 
recall protocols, and the program's relationship with the current RRF operations during 
peacetime and a contingency. 
Interviewee One: 
I suspect there is a substantial part of Title 46, the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), to do a stand-alone. If you are going to do 
recoupment of an education investment, you are going to need legislation, 
which is going to end up in Title 46. 
Interviewee Eight: 
I don't know what could be put into place to guarantee that an individual 
will do what they say they are going to do when it comes to being part of 
that program. If there is any action that you could take against individuals 
that sign on for the program, something comes up, and they say they do 
not want to be part of the program any more...or whatever...there will 
probably have to be some laws put in place to guarantee once an 
individual signs up that he will do what he says he is going to do. 
Interviewee Nine also added: 
It is all there in the 36 Act, but you would have a lot of implementation 
rules to write. 
Finally, Interviewee Six commented that it might be difficult finding enough 
unlicensed mariners for this type of backup pool because of the current difficulty in 
filling existing unlicensed sailing positions. 
I know the unlicensed people are hurting for people right now...I don't 
think there are enough people around to either have a cadre or for 
someone to do something else. 
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C.        DUAL USMS/MMR PROGRAM 
1. What are the Major Advautages? 
The number one advantage mentioned by six of the individuals was that the MMR 
program was already in existence. Interviewees felt that it made sense to leverage an 
existing program with an established system to administer, train, recall, recruit, track, and 
fund program participants. Also, because it already exists, it would be easier to develop 
with regard to developing new laws or legislation. 
Interviewee One: 
It would also make things like security clearances, up to secret level 
anyway, a whole lot easier then just by USMS alone... there is an existing 
bureaucracy to support the USNR. If, for example, you had an emergency 
manning crisis and you need to get people moving quickly, then an option 
becomes to just cut them AT orders to get them where they need to go and 
then get the recall orders to catch up with them. 
Interviewee Ten: 
The greatest advantage of using the MMR program is that it is already 
established. It has a lot of shortcomings but it already exists...you would 
not need new legislation...you wouldn't need much more than a MOU, 
but, and this is a personal view, to make the MMR work, you have to take 
it out from under the Navy's management by the TAR organization. 
Interviewee Eight: 
That [leveraging an existing program] would be a plus for a dual 
program...you have a lot of training things already established with the 
MMR program that could possibly cross over. 
Two other advantages mentioned include the fact that MMR members are familiar 
with RRF vessels because of ATs done with MARAD, and also the potential for 
increased training for program participants because they could train as an USMS instead 
of a naval reservist. 
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One advantage that the researcher anticipated finding proved not to be true. By 
creating a dual USMS/MMR program, the advantage of recalling these MMR officers as 
civilians under their USCG license qualification was expected. This was not the case. 
Most interviewees did not have a problem with military officers serving on RRF vessels 
providing all other civilian mariner sources had been exhausted. Finally, one individual 
was completely against using MMR officers to crew RRF vessels in any situation. 
2.        What are the Major Disadvantages? 
The key disadvantages for a dual USMS/MMR program dealt with potential 
differences between USMS goals and Navy goals for such a program. Disadvantages 
included: allegiance to crewing RRF vessels as civilians versus Navy mission 
requirements, mismatch between USMS requirements and naval reserve requirements 
necessary for proper career path progression, and funding arguments over which 
organization pays for what requirements. 
Interviewee Seven 
On the same token...as far as being a reservist...career path wise...you 
could get kind of screwed in that you are trying to be set up to be on an 
RRF ship and maybe it is not in your training plan or you are not checking 
the boxes in your reserve career. There could be a bit of conflict there. 
If you had a good training plan put together to facilitate that...the guy is 
doing great and is getting great fitness reports for following the training 
plan and promoted. That is my reserve viewpoint of it. The other thing 
is...when you put a naval officer on the ship...I have run into before 
where there is a little bit of apprehension from the ship managers. Who is 
this guy? There has to be a clear communication with the ship managers 
in the case of the RRF ships as to what is being done. 
Interviewee Two 
Funds would be the primary one.. .if one created a shortage of funds from 
another area. It is important that the two work together vice separate. 
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Interviewee Ten: 
The disadvantage is that there is a disconnect. When there is a dual 
obligation there is always going to be a fight as to who is going to use 
them when you need them. You need oversight, not the TARS...an 
oversight organization, perhaps an existing organization such as MSC. 
But there has to be someone that decides that a given individual is going to 
be more advantageous as a civilian on this ship. On the other hand, we 
need this skill on active duty. That has to be someone who truly 
understands the program from both the civilian and military side and has 
the authority to activate the person as a civilian or military. But that has to 
be in the hands of some organization that truly understands the needs of 
the Navy, the needs of MSC, and the availability of your personnel. 
Interviewee Twelve: 
But what you are going to wind up with is people on the Naval Reserve 
side saying, "don't spend any of our money on the USMS side."...I think 
the Navy guys would understand that you need an officer qualified on the 
ship and whether he came out of the MMR side or the USMS side would 
not be important...the important thing would be that billet would be filled 
so that military cargo could be moved...that would be the argument of 
using military funding to support the training, licenses, or maintenance on 
the USMS side. It is going to be a delicate thing. 
The other disadvantage offered concerned the status of a MMR officer serving on 
board a RRF vessel in USMS capacity. Is that individual considered a civilian, a 
government employee, or a military officer and what protection does the individual have 
if something happens like an accident or even death? 
Interviewee Seven: 
How are these guys protected if they get killed as a USMS compared to 
being under orders as a military? That should be looked at...benefits for 
their families and that type of thing. In fact, I just saw something about 
the Geneva Convention for mariners in a magazine that discussed that 
issue. Those issues need to be considered...what the coverage is and how 
they fit into the Geneva Conference. Civilian Mariners (CIVMARS) with 
MSC.. .as a CIVMARI used to carry around a little card with me, and if I 
was ever taken prisoner, I fell under the Geneva Conference...but that is a 
broader question for mariners in general. 
66 
Also addressed by five interviewees, as a disadvantage was the fact that a dual 
USMS/MMR program does not include unlicensed mariners. This would also be an 
advantage of the stand-alone program but because there was a probe question pertaining 
directly to it for this program, it received more comments. 
Interviewee Nine: 
The unlicensed problem.. .that is really worse than the licensed. Your 
program [the dual program] only addresses the licensed. 
It is important also to note that three individuals explained that not having 
unlicensed mariners in the dual program was not a concern. Interviewee Ten explained 
that officers (licensed mariners) in the merchant marine are fully qualified and capable of 
serving in unlicensed billets on ships. Therefore, MMR officers could fill unlicensed 
billets on board RRF vessels if required. He believes one of the reasons this is a foreign 
concept, and difficult for the Navy to understand, is that the Navy rank structure does not 
provide the same flexibility for officers to serve in enlisted billets. He states: 
I don't think it is a disadvantage if you accept the philosophy that the 
Navy doesn't. In the merchant marine, they do not make the great 
distinction as the military does between officers and enlisted. There are a 
number of licensed people in the merchant marine that are currently 
sailing in what you would consider as enlisted billets...unlicensed 
billets... this is unheard of in the Navy. The Navy would not take an 
ensign and put them in a petty officer slot. A naval officer is not trained in 
those specialties, but in the merchant marine, they are. Every licensed 
deck or engineering officer is already trained, capable, and fully qualified 
to do any job in the unlicensed departments. This is something the TARs 
do not understand and to a great degree the Navy doesn't understand 
either. But it would not at all be a disadvantage to take a junior third mate 
or engineer and put them in an unlicensed billet. 
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3. What    Incentives    or    Assurances    Are    Needed    for    Affected 
Organizations to Support/Participate in the Program? 
Some of the answers to this question were similar to those received as it applied 
to a stand-alone USMS pool. Concerns about meaningful training, qualification status, 
and a proper recall mechanism were mentioned for a dual USMS/MMR and for a stand- 
alone USMS. Other interviewees generally supported the initiative and did not have any 
specific concerns. 
Some interviewees were concerned about the status of a MMR officer while 
serving under USMS capacity. They wanted assurances that the rights of the officers 
serving in a USMS capacity were protected. Other interviewees wanted assurances that 
the purpose of the program is clearly defined and that current MMIRRG officers are 
aware of this purpose and how they will be affected by the addition of USMS to the 
program. 
Interviewee One: 
One of the first questions if you recall people in their USMS status is what 
is their veteran status? One of the advantages of being recalled as USNR 
is that you have things like first-day medical coverage, and, though there 
are reemployment rights for both [military and civilian mariners], it works 
easier through the DoD plan. What kind of benefits will be offered? And 
if we do a standard benefit package and that exceeds what is offered on the 
ship, then how are we going to work that out? And who is going to end up 
paying it? That kind of thing. 
Interviewee Four: 
The big question would be why? The other question...from the people in 
the program, they would wonder why would they want to be part of a   , 
make-believe service that doesn't have an established track record.  What 
is going to be in it for them? 
Interviewee Eight: 
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We have the mechanism in place to ensure the MMR is available to sail 
through the Navy recall system. If we had a dual thing, we would have to 
set something up, through the USMS side. 
Interviewee Six did not need any assurances to support the program: 
The way we work it with MARAD, we feel that by the time that we got 
down to one of these extreme programs or something...we would be so 
low that we would be glad to get a body just to fill out the ship 
complement. 
4. What Incentives Are Needed to Entice Individual Mariners to Join 
and Remain in the Program? 
There were not many answers provided that specifically addressed this question. 
This was due to two reasons. First, many of the answers that were provided as individual 
incentives for the stand-alone are already established for members of the current MMR 
program.   These include incentives such as pay, training opportunities, and a retirement 
plan. Second, the question was not asked in such a way to elicit responses for both 
options, but as it applied to individual' mariners in general. This was because most 
entrants into the program come from USMMA or the state academies that participate in 
the SIP. These individuals are required to join the MMR; they do not volunteer. Also, as 
the program currently exists, there are rules and regulations governing what individual 
incentives can or cannot be provided. However, one individual provided answers 
specifically applicable to a dual USMS/MMR program. 
Interviewee One: 
Well, for those that are obligated, if you are running a dual program, you 
are going to have a certain pool of men and women out of the academy for 
eight years so I do not think there is going to be a need for incentives at 
the third mate or assistant level. For the advanced licenses, I think that 
you are going to need to guarantee that they can go to school and keep 
their STCW up to date as part of the training process so that they do not 
have to do their two week Navy annual training and then an additional two 
weeks for schools to maintain their license. 
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5. What Are the Training and Qualification Requirements? 
Questions regarding training and qualification requirements were not specifically 
asked as they applied to a dual USMS/MMR program. Because the intent of a dual 
USMS/MMR program would be for its participants to serve as a back-up pool of inactive 
mariners to crew RRF vessels during a contingency, it can be assumed that these 
participants would need the same type and frequency of training as do members of a 
stand-alone USMS. 
Incidentally, Interviewee Eight was asked if members of the current MMR 
program are directed to take specific types of training, for instance that necessary for a 
steam endorsement. He stated that the current policy is not to direct individuals to take 
specific training or obtain specific endorsements. If a dual program is established, a 
training plan would have to be developed that specified, for example, training that is 
unique to the RRF. It will also have to reflect how many and which program participants 
would need to have any given qualification. 
6. What Are the Sign Up and Obligation Requirements for Members 
Participating in the Program? 
Interviewees did not provide any major changes to the current obligation of six 
years active, and two years inactive upon entry into the MMR program after graduation 
from a maritime academy. The interviewees felt it should be left the same, had no strong 
bias, or were not familiar enough with the program to provide an answer. A concern that 
a couple of interviewees had with the ability to recall an individual in a stand-alone 
USMS was not a problem for a dual program since members are still in the Navy and fall 
under Naval jurisdiction. However, Interviewee Four described the current obligation 
policy for MMR members that have completed their initial eight-year obligation: 
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They have not been [required to obligate for a given period of time]. 
Normally how it works is that if they have satisfactorily participated in the 
program, they are allowed to stay in the program. That means they 
maintain their licenses, do their physical, send in their annual report, and 
those types of items. The incentive to do that is to do the two-week ATs 
and for some that are more aggressive, is to get 20 qualifying years for 
retirement. 
7.        What Organization(s) Should Manage the Program? 
Most of interviewees believed it would be best to have the MMR Program Officer 
manage a new dual USMS/MMR program. Similar to answers received when asked 
pertaining to a stand-alone program, there would be a need for additional manpower and 
resources to properly perform the mission. There was concern expressed by three 
individuals about possible conflicts in interests or priorities when it came to USMS 
requirements and naval requirements. It will be important for relationships and protocols 
between MARAD and the Navy to be worked out to ensure proper management of the 
program. 
Interviewee One: 
I suggest that they stay with the office in New Orleans and create a 
DOT/DoD MOA dual-hatting the program manager as the MMR boss in 
charge of training and operations. 
Interviewee Four: 
I think from that standpoint, you have the whole Navy's infrastructure in 
place on recalling. Literally, at every reserve activity, every port, the 
bases are in place to make this thing happen smoothly....If it were dual, 
this office would be the logical place for it. Of course, this office would 
have to expand. 
Interviewee Six: 
If they were going to do training with the Navy guys, I would keep it 
down at New Orleans, but they will have to get their staff increased. Now, 
is the Navy going to put up with the extra expense for doing something for 
MARAD? Or is it going to ask for more money? No matter how you do 
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it, there is going to be an increase in shoreside personnel for whoever has 
the record keeping for it...everyone tells me they are two blocked right 
now. New Orleans only has six people and MARAD only has three in 
their own office. 
Interviewee Eight was concerned about possible management conflicts that could 
develop if there are competing interests or different requirements for a given individual: 
There will probably be a conflict in managing that...between what the 
Navy and civilian requirements may be for that particular individual. 
a. Use ofMMROCH SELRES to Manage either a Dual or Stand- 
Alone Program 
Each interviewee was also asked their opinion if the members of the 
MMROCH units, the SELRES portion of the MMR Program, could be used to manage 
either a dual or stand-alone USMS program. The majority who were familiar with this 
aspect of the MMR program believed they could indeed participate in the management 
and coordination of either of these programs. The interviewees in favor of their 
involvement provided these comments: 
Interviewee Two: 
This MMROCH unit could if it was expanded. For example, at the 
shipyard I was at, we assigned each reservist 21-day ATs and linked them 
together so we always had someone there and had 52-week coverage. If 
you took this MMROCH unit with eight, you could expand it to 25...two 
weeks a year your AT will be at MARAD.. .but that is not fair because we 
need to train and do other things. So you need to give us additional time. 
Or you can overlap where the desk is covered. Having one guy here at 
MARAD west would be more than enough to coordinate the 27 ships 
times four people against each ship. There again, you don't need a huge 
bureaucracy out there.. .it is already here. 
Interviewee Ten: 
I suggested that years ago...when I was the skipper of the New York 
MMROCH unit. My suggestion was to divide the nation into four 
areas...you have four MMROCH units and they should be the ones 
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coordinating the training, the manning, and recall of these people. But the 
TARs would not have anything to do with it. The MMR SELRES are 
severely underutilized because the TARs want them to function like every 
other good SELRES and the Merchant Marine does not fit...they are 
trying to put a round peg in a square hole. They insist on it. Their attitude 
is...if it doesn't fit, then they are not good reservists. 
Interviewee Six: 
Yes. Right now they are moving the New York unit down to 
Baltimore...and eventually down to Norfolk. That would be a good mix. 
They have ten, eleven, twelve people in a unit.. .they could do their two 
weeks a year as training officers for MARAD. That is a good mix.. .that is 
a good move. And you have San Francisco...so you have two coasts 
covered with someone sitting near an RRF fleet. That would be a good 
thing for the MMR program. 
Interviewee Four suggested his preferred way to manage the program. He 
said: 
At this time I would think that SELRES would not be the logical 
management tool. I think that fulltime staff would better serve them. 
8. What are the Obstacles (Real or Perceived) in Using the USMS 
Concept to Develop a Dual USMS/MMR Program? 
One of the main obstacles identified by the interviewees highlighted potential 
military and civilian cultural and structural issues. The potential differences that result 
from a program participant being in a USMS status or military status need to be 
addressed. Other issues such as what are the program priorities, who is in charge, and 
recall/activation procedures need to be resolved. Also, some of the obstacles that were 
provided for a stand-alone USMS program such as costs and achieving stakeholder buy 
in were mentioned as well. 
Interviewee Eleven: 
The major issue there would be the mix of military and civilian and who is 
in   charge.   The   big   question   gets   into   military   structure   versus 
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nonmilitary.. .or lack of structure. 
Interviewee Eight: 
And what happens if something happens to an individual... is he a civilian 
or a military guy. If he is military, there are certain things that fall into 
place if he is a military individual that gets killed in action. Does he get 
the same benefits as a regular military guy if he is sailing as a civilian? 
To help resolve these obstacles, interviewees felt that a MOU between the Navy 
and MARAD was essential for program establishment. Protocols would also need to be 
developed to address the obstacles the interviewees provided. 
Interviewee Four: 
There should be a revision to the 36 Act to write in this new USMS group. 
There would also need to be a MOU between the Navy and MARAD to 
define a clear-cut role on who would be recalled first, and what are the 
actual requirements to be in the USMS vice the Navy. Those would have 
to be put in black and white and agreed upon. 
Interviewee Five: 
At a minimum, we would need a MOU or MOA between the Navy and 
MARAD. We also would need understandings and agreements with the 
unions and the ship managers, as we also would for a stand-alone program 
on how we would administer it...how we would protect their influence in 
a-particular area. 
Interviewee Thirteen stated that there would be objections to adding the USMS 
designator to MMR officers from the Reserve Officers Association (ROA). He stated: 
If you have a guy that is a MMR/USNR.. .you can put anything else on it 
you want like USMS...he is still a USNR officer and the only reason you 
are getting your arms around him is that he is a USNR officer. I don't 
think there is any way you can do that without changing the law. I don't 
think that if you are introducing special legislation, you are not going to 
get that approved.. .and I don't think you will get legislation through to do 
that...I have met with the ROA people, the Reserve Officer Association, 
and they see it as something dangerous. They see it being dangerous to be 
able to call up a selective group of people to do a specific job rather than 
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under the purview of the whole reserve program. 
D.       OPINIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS ON THE FORMING OF A STAND- 
ALONE USMS OR DUAL USMS/MMR POOL 
Three standard questions were initially asked of the interviewees to determine 
their preferred approach to establishing a back-up pool, their level of support for 
MARAD's USMS initiative, and also to obtain their ideas on other approaches to help 
achieve "assured access" of merchant mariners for RRF contingency crewing. 
Determining the interviewees' preferred approach to the establishment of a USMS pool 
was the primary research question for this thesis. Additionally, a fourth question 
emerged based on one of the answers provided by Interviewee Five. Interviewee Five 
suggested that if a stand-alone USMS program was created, one of the options for 
USMMA graduates and SIP participants at the state academies could be to directly enter 
the USMS. Each subsequent interviewee was then asked for his opinion on this option. 
1. Primary Question: Given the Need for a Backup Pool, What is the 
Best Approach to Satisfy the Need: A USMS Stand-Alone Program, A 
Dual USMS/MMR Program, or A Combination Of Both? 
Eight interviewees responded that a USMS stand-alone program was the best 
approach to establish a backup mariner pool. Provided that adequate funding could be 
obtained, those interviewees believed that a stand-alone pool would provide more 
advantages over a dual USMS/MMR program. Major benefits included: 
• The program would include both unlicensed and licensed mariners 
• Avoid potential barriers with civilian and military differences 
• Provide an incentive to non-actively sailing mariners to maintain their 
licenses 
• Provide a good complementary program for licensed mariners that either 
do not meet MMR program requirements or have completed their 
obligation and no longer want to deal with a military organization 
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Typically not all of the responses from the interviewees are provided, however, 
since this is the primary research question, it is important to provide a portion of each 
individual's ideas that could otherwise be lost in an executive summary of their answers. 
Interviewee Two: 
I think a dual-linked program works best because it has a common 
objective that utilizes all the existing components such as the ship 
companies, the union, the Navy, and the schools with the end result being 
trained mariners that fill the shortfalls. 
Interviewee Four: 
If you were not going to create a USMS, then I like the option of a dual. 
When the Navy puts people out to pasture and I think too early before 
their usable lives.. .someone in their early 50s would still be very useful to 
man a ship. That is, where a USMS would be a good second home for 
them to go, and to continue to obtain training, and to continue to give back 
to the sealift readiness of the country. 
Interviewee Five: 
There is a whole lot of "ifs." If we can get adequate funding for a stand- 
alone program, that is the way to go. If we can convince people that the 
USMS is a viable concept and one worthy of developing and funding, I 
don't think you need the MMR.. .1 think you can do it completely with the 
flexibility of the USMS, which can serve again all manpower positions 
including unlicensed. It is such a leap to assume that we are going to be 
able to get there.. .1 think it is worth a try.. .I'm willing to try that concept. 
Interviewee Eight: 
The best approach would be to have a stand-alone USMS pool of 
individuals. If you can work it out where those individual guarantee that 
they will be available for any kind of contingency; I think it would be the 
best way to go. I think it would satisfy the unions...satisfy MARAD...it 
would get us out of the business... even though I think the MMR program 
is a good program.. .it would take the pressure off the MMR program. 
Interviewee Six: 
I think the USMS is the best idea...it has more chance of success if put 
forward the right way. I think the way they would do the training is on 
RRF ships, where MARAD needs the people to be the best trained. I think 
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the thought of having a conflict between unions and the USMS program is 
remote because the USMS program would be made up of non-sailing 
people. 
Interviewee Eleven: 
I would go for the new stand-alone commercial based group but I don't 
think you will get rid of the existing MMR [not associated with the 
USMS], so the answer then comes out dual. 
This new one [USMS program] is trying to provide a pool [of inactive 
mariners] that was available before that could just renew their licenses 
back in the early 90's.. .back in the Persian Gulf War time. After February 
2002, they won't be able to sail internationally because of the lack of 
certificates and endorsements under STCW...therefore, this [USMS] pool 
is a vital pool that reestablishes a pool that we need that we lost...and if 
we just made it [in terms of mariners available to crew ships] back in the 
Persian Gulf War, how in the hell are we going to make it today without 
them this time.. .so we need them...so to establish it is good. The MMR 
was there last time...it didn't do anything [no officers were recalled to 
active duty], so as it is today, it probably wouldn't do much. 
Interviewee Twelve: 
From an institutional barrier perspective, having the USMS and MMR 
program separate from each other would eliminate a lot of the current 
problems...I favor a separate USMS and a MMR program...looking at 
institutional barrier and the fact that those that didn't fit into the MMR 
program could fit into the USMS program. 
Interviewee Fourteen: 
I think the stand-alone pool is the best approach.. .because that pool would 
consist of licensed and unlicensed mariners. 
Two of the interviewees preferred a dual USMS/MMR program. They believed it 
would be easier to establish a dual program and it would provide more flexibility to use 
members of this program as either military officers or as civilian mariners. 
Interviewee Nine: 
I think the dual is probably better because it will be easier to establish 
training programs through the MMR units. 
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Interviewee Ten: 
For full flexibility and integration I would say using the MMR and the 
USMS together. That is probably the most difficult to implement but it 
gives you the most flexibility and in time of national emergency, that is 
what you need. It is going to be the toughest thing to sell, but I think it is 
the most beneficial to the country and I think when all is said and done, 
that is what this is mostly for. 
Only Interviewee Seven specifically supported the development of a stand-alone 
USMS and a dual USMS/MMR program. His reasons were as follows: 
I think both because you get the most.. .more people.. .both licensed.. .and 
you get the unlicensed with a stand-alone program. I think you should 
start in small steps and maybe go with the reserve program first...but I 
think you should do both... the reason I say that is because you are 
looking at getting the unlicensed. You need them just as much to operate 
the ships and by just by going with the dual one, if you are short on 
unlicensed too...you are going to have a hard time getting the ship 
underway. 
Finally, Interviewee Thirteen believed that neither program should be pursued. 
His contention was that a stand-alone USMS program, regardless of its possible 
advantages, was unattainable because of its substantial cost. Also, as a firm believer and 
one of the individuals responsible for the MMR program reestablishment in 1979, he did 
not think that one of the intended missions for MMR officers should be to crew RRF 
vessels. He provided the following: 
I was involved in reestablishing the whole MMR program. And there are 
certain things there in the reestablishment that they could train these 
people to be used as naval auxiliaries in time of national emergency. So 
that if you brought up a fellow and it was more the activation of a fellow 
in the USNR, then he could serve a useful purpose in working with the 
Merchant Marine...not working on the Merchant Marine ships but 
working with the Merchant Marine...because the Merchant Marine 
becomes the fourth line of defense... the MMR was not established to man 
the RRF vessels at all. 
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2.        Do  you   in   General   Support  the  Initiatives   that  MARAD   has 
Proposed? 
When asked the above question, most of the interviewees said they supported 
MARAD's initiative of using the USMS program to establish a back-up pool of mariners. 
Two interviewees were opposed and one individual was undecided. Those who 
supported the initiative said: 
Interviewee Five: 
I do agree with it. I think we have to do something.. .1 think the Merchant 
Marine has shrunk to a level... whether the cushion of the manpower pool 
that we have is adequate to withstand the pressures of a large-scale 
activation of government ships. We had problems in Desert Storm, and 
the industry was larger back then than it is now...we have overcome a lot 
of their concerns with manpower on the one hand with partial permanent 
pools are ships... even though you have taken care of those concerns with 
permanent crews.. .you still have a smaller Merchant Marine and less of a 
cushion to work with from the standpoint of available labor that may be on 
the beach. We are at a point that we have some concerns and there are 
potential problems. We think that there are some real potential problems. 
We think that we would have some problems where we had an extended 
activation where it was long enough where we were rotating crews...we 
just don't think the labor base is large enough to withstand those kinds of 
pressures, in all ratings, in all cases, when you have a fully engaged 
commercial fleet. We think something has to be done. We think this is a 
very viable tool that can help alleviate problems that we may have. 
Interviewee Eleven: 
Yes I would...I think they ought to do it given the requirement...let's say 
the reduction of available qualified Merchant Marine 
officers. ..particularly with the STCW. 
Interviewee Nine provided the following answer with another approach to the 
mariner shortage issue: 
No, because I do not think it is affordable. I do not think it will ever get 
approved. I think we stand a better chance of leveraging government 
contracts and the MSP payments to create additional billets at sea and 
forcing them to put trainees out there for that. 
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3.        Is there a Better Way to Achieve "Assured Availability" of Merchant 
Mariners for RRF Contingency Crewing? 
The above question was asked in order to obtain the expert opinions of the 
interviewees on other ways to achieve "assured availability" of mariners in addition to 
using the USMS concept. The number-one answer provided was for the U.S to have a 
large, healthy, Merchant Marine. If the U.S. had more U.S-flagged vessels, that would 
result in more billets for mariners and therefore a larger active pool to draw from in the 
event of a contingency. In fact, some interviewees suggested that our interview probably 
would not be taking place if a robust Merchant Marine existed. Some of the interviewees 
provided possible ways to achieve this. Specific comments include: 
Interviewee Ten: 
The best way is far beyond our ability to plan and that is if we had a large 
healthy Merchant Marine. I don't see that happening in the foreseeable 
future because of globalization and the insistence on the reduction of 
crews and increased profits. The companies are going to register their 
vessels under the flag that makes them the most money. And so you will 
get flag of convenience ships. You have a choice: you can either subsidize 
the US-flag Merchant Marine so it can compete with the lower cost third 
world nations...and I don't think that is in the books right now...and so 
the alternative is to have people qualified to operate ships that you either 
have in lay up or charter or lease on the open market when you need them. 
Interviewee Six: 
The "A" answer to this whole thing is if we had a viable Merchant Marine, 
we wouldn't be having this conversation. 
Interviewee Two believed cargo preference would help solve the problem: 
An active fleet...and cargo preference would also solve these problems. 
You could have it for ten percent of U.S. cargo...even five percent. We 
are nuts not to do that. If we had five percent, it would result in 350 ships. 
It should be plugged in an economic sense. No one has really done a 
return on investment that American ships and mariners put back into the 
economy. Foreign mariners do not put any money back into the economy. 
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Some interviewees' answers focused on how to increase the number of billets 
while working within the current structure and vessel numbers. Interviewee Nine 
believed leveraging MSP contracts would be good way to increase the number of billets: 
I think we stand a better chance of leveraging government contracts and 
the MSP payments to create additional billets at sea and forcing them to 
put trainees out there for that. 
Interviewee Fourteen's focus was on creating more jobs, but also in better using 
theRRF: 
Yes I do. If you get more mariners working, there wouldn't be a shortage. 
If I have more entry-level jobs, I could have more ABs and firemen. It is 
really that simple...and the perfect place to create those entry level jobs is 
on the RRF ships.. .but they have to get past the issue of sea time with the 
Coast Guard to do that...somebody should be working on all of those 
ships...there should be a skeleton crew on every one of those ships. There 
should be a Bosun, there should be an AB, there should be a QMED, and 
there should be an Ordinary Seaman as well as a cook...and they 
shouldn't be going home every night. They should be staying on those 
vessels. That creates five jobs per ship instead of five jobs for every ten 
ships.. .and that is what they are doing right now.. .they are rotating crews 
from one ship to the next and they are going home every night. 
The biggest thing I'm pushing is to create more jobs within the industry 
instead of worrying about pools and keeping enough people working so 
the pool wouldn't be a factor.. .for licensed and unlicensed. 
Interviewee Eleven, although supportive of growing the active U.S. fleet, still 
believed some action similar to the USMS backup pool concept needed to be explored. 
There may be other ways...but this is one way of part of our 
study...comparing 1990 to now...it is an aspect where we are working on 
trying to do unlicensed apprentice programs and this transition pool [for 
graduating USMMA and SIP participants] so they don't get automatically 
waived...the pool that hasn't been tagged or solved is the one you are 
talking about...the ones that are retired or are sitting at home and doing 
something else...they won't have the credentials to go...and we have just 
lost that pool unless we do something like this. 
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4. Opinions  on  Whether  a  Graduate  from  the  USMMA  or  State 
Academy  SIP  Participants  Should  Have  the  Option  of Directly 
Joining the USMS 
When an individual graduates from the USMMA or from a state academy (SIP 
participants only), they have an obligation to go on active military duty or to actively sail 
as a commercial mariner (unless a waiver is granted) and join the MMR program. 
Interviewee Five suggested that if a stand-alone USMS program existed, those same 
graduates should either be required or have the option of going directly into the USMS. 
He provided the following: 
The way I would envision it.. .if we had a stand-alone USMS, it becomes a 
quid pro quo. In other words, you wouldn't demand that they go into the 
MMR; you demand they go into the USMS. I don't see why you just 
couldn't make that the obligation...you would have to change the law but 
I think that would be the cleaner way of doing it. I guess we could give 
them the option of the USMS or MMR. I guess if a guy wanted a naval 
career instead of a Merchant Marine career...I don't see a problem with 
offering a guy the MMR option, but, if they take the MMR option, and 
you have the USMS, I'm not sure if the MMR guy would be focused on 
serving our sealift ships if you have the USMS. I think that is what the 
USMS would be for and I would view the MMR officer as something.. .to 
serve as a naval officer on a naval ship perhaps instead of as a commercial 
mariner on a RRF ship. Why have the two guys with different uniforms 
serving the same purpose. I don't see why you would do that. 
When other interviewees were asked about direct entry into the USMS, most of 
the interviewees said they could envision this new option. However, two more important 
issues were raised. First, the interviewees felt that actively sailing to gain maritime 
experience upon graduation was the most important thing for graduates to do. They 
should either be actively sailing or go on active duty. Second, the intent of a stand-alone 
USMS program is to have a backup pool of experienced inactively sailing mariners for 
potential RRF contingency crewing needs. If graduates directly entered the USMS after 
graduation, they will either be actively sailing or non-actively sailing. Those mariners 
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actively sailing would be considered part of the active pool, which is good for the overall 
industry but does not meet the intent of the goal for a backup pool. The other side of the 
issue is if these graduates are not actively sailing, they would meet the intent of a backup 
pool, but would be lacking in experience. Interviewee Thirteen stated is was possible but 
the Navy would resist it: 
Sure.. .that may be the way to do it. And I think the Navy would be losing 
a lot of talent. I don't think the leadership within the Navy would go 
along with it. 
Interviewee Fourteen was concerned about the level of experience: 
I think you could do that...but the problem you have again is that these 
guys that come out as third engineers or third mates and they never ever 
go onto a ship.. .what are they going to do when they get to a ship? They 
are not going to know what to do...you navigate and stuff like that, you 
are never going to remember it unless you work with it...they are not 
going to be any good to you unless they have experience. 
Interviewee Ten believed it would be popular provided it was designed 
properly: 
I think that would be a very popular option provided that the rewards were 
the same as going MMR...the USMS cannot be looked at, as a second 
grade or stepchild system or no one will want to participate. Right now, 
the government needs some type of mariner pool more that the mariner 
needs the government. There has to be an equal incentive...it cannot be 
second rate... "you are in the USMS while I am in the MMR"...can't be 
that way...it must be equal. It means that equal training opportunities are 
available, the funding for the program is the same...people get the same 
type of benefits as far as using facilities like Exchanges and Bachelor 
Officer Quarters...it has to be across the board. It has to be a fully 
recognized and accepted civilians reserve program. 
E.        SUMMARY 
The purpose of this summary is two-fold. First, it provides a condensed version of 
the data analysis that can quickly be scanned and specific information easily found. 
Second, it includes some additional inputs and opinions the interviewees provided that 
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were not specifically mentioned in this chapter. The next chapter draws upon this 
analysis to state some conclusions and provide recommendations. 
Questions Stand-alone USMS Dual USMS/MMR 
1. What are the 
advantages? 
-Provide a back up pool of 
experienced mariners 
-Quick, guaranteed access 
-Target specific rates where shortages 
exist, or unique RRF skill sets 
-Increase size of non-sailing mariner 
pool 
-Counteract STCW 95 
-Civilian program: no Navy influence 
or confusion of roles 
-Good second home for previous 
MMR officers 
-Can have both unlicensed and 
licensed mariners 
-Volunteer organization: participants 
not forced to obligate 
-Could entice non-actively sailing 
mariners to rejoin active pool 
-Formalize non-sailing data base 
-No advantage could exceed cost of 
the program 
-MMR program is already in 
existence 
-Leverage established system to 
administer, train, recall, recruit, track 
and fund participants 
-Easier to develop with regard to new 
laws or legislation 
-Guaranteed access to USNR/MMR 
-Provides flexibility to use 
participants as civilian mariners or 
naval officers 
-Able to recall as civilians to crew 
RRF vessels. 
-Prevents civilian/ military 
structural/cultural issues 
-MMR officers are already familiar 
with RRF vessels from ATs. 
-No Advantage: Crewing RRF 
vessels is not their intended purpose 
2. What are the 
disadvantages? 
-Cost/obtaining adequate funding 
-New program that has never been 
done before 
-No   current   infrastructure   within 
MARAD to handle program 
-Provide a false sense of security with 
regard to contingency crewing 
-Lack   of   exposure   to   maritime 
vessels/ not hands on 
-Physical   capability   concerns   for 
retirees in pool 
-Stir up unions: pay issues, non-union 
participants 
-Confusion of USMS role 
-Program could be viewed as separate 
from current structure 
-Potential differences between USMS 
goals and Navy goals for program 
-Allegiance to crewing RRF vessels 
as civilians versus Navy mission 
requirements 
-Mismatch between USMS 
requirements and naval reserve 
promotion requirements 
-Funding arguments over which 
organization pays for what 
-No unlicensed mariners in program 
-Compete for same money 
-Status of officer while serving in 
USMS capacity (unclear) 
-Some MMR officers are actively 
sailing: would not be part of backup 
pool 
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participate in the 
program? 
- Participants must be properly 
trained and qualified to perform RRF 
mission 
-Participants must be available and 
prepared to go for short-notice 
activations 
- Mission must be articulated 
-Ensure program is on equal footing 
with other reserve programs 
- Formally include ship managers 
- Ensure pool does not draw out 
/reduce actively unlicensed sailing 
mariners 
- No specific concerns or assurances 
needed 
- Government pays for the training 
-Similar concerns/assurances to 
stand-alone: participants are trained, 
qualified, ready, and available to 
deploy, and proper recall mechanism 
-Clear purpose why and how the 
program will work 
-Same veteran status and access as 
military while in civilian status (e.g. 
medical, retirement points) 
-Should also have a stand-alone 
program because you lose bodies 
-Prove to ship managers you can get 
them and identify who they are 
4. What  • 
incentives are 
needed to entice 
mariners to join 
and remain in the 
program? 
-Pay for participants' license, 
training, and qualifications 
- Pay mariners (bonus to join, pay at 
rate you sail at when in training or 
active status) 
-Meaningful training 
-Access to activated RRF vessels 
-Retirement program (e.g. 401(k), 
limited, or similar to MMR program) 
-Guaranteed protection (e.g. death 
benefits) 
-Same status as military veterans 
-Commissary privileges (limited) 
-Minimum time commitment 
-Directly enter USMS from maritime 
academies - avoid Navy 
-Incentives for dual were not as big of 
concern because current MMR 
program provides most of 
recommended incentives for stand- 
alone (pay, training opportunities, 
and retirement plan), provided within 
current military rules 
-No particular incentives needed for 
participants in program less than 
eight years. For over eight years, 
guaranteed access to training during 
AT period, not additional time. 
-Mariner employee incentives and 
preferences if member of program 




-Must train on ships, with majority of 
time underway (RRF vessels 
primarily but also commercial) 
-Frequency of training: high of eight 
weeks to minimum of two weeks per 
year. Two weeks most preferred 
-Minimum training requirements: that 
necessary to maintain a current 
license, including STCW 95 
-RRF training: steam (biggest 
concern), cargo handing, OPDS, 
damage control, bridge management 
-All training needs to be incorporated 
in comprehensive training plan 
-Assign individuals to specific ships 
or types of ships 
-Training requirements for members 
of dual USMS/MMR would be same 
as listed for stand-alone. 
-Note: must change how training is 
determined for specific individuals. 
Currently no policy on who is 
qualified to what level or 
endorsement (e.g. steam) 
-Must have a comprehensive training 
plan 
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Questions Stand-alone USMS Dual USMS/MMR 
6. What are the 






-Participants must obligate to be 
recalled to crew RRF vessels and to 
go do training as required 
-Concern over enforcement of 
obligations (can they be involuntarily 
recalled?) 
-Five year obligation period (most 
common answer) tied to license 
renewal and physical 
-Tiered obligation with bonus for 
certain years obligated (e.g.$3K for 3 
years) 
- Five or six years initial obligation, 
then six months after that 
-Six years -same as out of academy 
-Should remain the same for initial 
obligation: currently six years active, 
two inactive 
-No strong bias on changing it 
-Could not give answer because 
unfamiliar with program 
Note: currently there is no obligation 
requirement for officers after their 
initial eight-year obligation. If 
program participants are relied upon 
as a backup pool for the RRF, an 






-MARAD should actively manage 
but need additional manpower and 
resources. Locate in Training or 
National Security Affairs 
-Managers need to be experienced 
mariners 
-Set up the office similar to that of 
current MMR program 
-Concern: need to have separate 
groups in charge of licensed and 
unlicensed 
-Form an umbrella group under MSC 
-Ship managers and/or unions should 
manage program and MARAD 
provide oversight 
-Leave as currently is: in New 
Orleans under a Lieutenant 
Commander as program manager and 
six staff members. Would need to 
expand personnel and obligate more 
money 
-Naval reserve must do - don't 
separate program from Navy 
-Need a more experienced and senior 
person managing the program, such 
as an 0-6 
-Did not offer opinion because of 
current MMR program study 
7a. Opinions on 
idea of using ship 
managers or 




-MARAD would need to retain 
administrative control. Ship mangers 
could coordinate training 
-Against ship managers doing it - too 
much on their plates 
-Could subset - cogram participants 
by the different unions 
-Keep away from unions - must be 
flexible 
-Would be difficult to do - mismatch 
of billet assignment among various 
unions and ship mangers. Paperwork 
drill 
-Unions could manage retirees. They 
know who these people are 
-Not opposed 
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-Yes, they could. Would need to 
increase size of units 
-Could use ATs so someone was 
always at MARAD 
-Yes, could play a role. Currently 
underutilized 
-Yes, suggested similar use years ago 
-Yes, could use. Help in recall/ 
contact mariners 
-Not familiar enough to answer 
-No, need a full-time staff to do it 
8. What are the 
obstacles (real or 
perceived) in 





policies, or laws 
need to be created 
or modified to 
accomplish this 
task? 
-Obtaining adequate funding 
-New program has never been tried 
before 
-Stakeholder opposition (to prevent, 
need stakeholders, especially unions 
and ship mangers, involved. Must 
properly explain program purpose) 
-Need to justify need and purpose of 
program to gain support 
-There are not enough unlicensed 
mariners for current needs, let alone 
to fill a USMS pool 
-Must be well organized. Funds 
cannot come out of operating costs 
-Must have a senior person in charge 
Rules, Policies, Regulations, or 
Laws: 
-Need to modify Merchant Marine 
Act of 36 and Title 46 of CFR 
-Need extensive implementation rules 
and protocols 
-Need to change laws as they effect 
obligation from academy. 
Changes need to address: 
-Enforcement of program participant' 
requirements and obligations 
-Recall to crew RRF vessels 
-Recoupment of education 
investment 
-Need to get consensus among 
stakeholders (difficult objective) 
-Mix of civilian and military (cultural 
differences) 
-Retired Officer Association opposed 
to having selective recall outside of 
typical reserve recall structure 
-Who is in charge? Navy or 
MARAD? 
-Structural and cultural differences: 
convince union not stealing jobs 
-Navy recall system/how match with 
USMS 
-Cost to perform additional mission 
Rules, Policies, Regulations, or 
Laws: 
-Must have a MOU/MOA between 
Navy and MARAD explaining roles, 
purpose, recall priorities and 
procedures, etc. 
-Modify Merchant Marine Act of 36 
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Question Opinions of interviewees 
1. Primary Question: 
Given the need for a 
backup pool, what is 
the best approach to 
satisfy the need: a 
USMS stand-alone 
program, a dual 
USMS/MMR program, 
or a combination of 
both? 
STAND-ALONE: (8) 
-Common objective of having trained mariners that fill the shortfalls. 
Should encompass all components of industry and also complement MMR 
program 
-The USMS would provide a good second home for MMR officers upon 
completion of obligation or after their Navy retirement 
-Pursue the USMS if we can get adequate funding. Must ensure USMS is a 
viable concept 
-Addresses all manpower positions, including unlicensed 
-USMS has a greater chance of success if presented properly. Program 
participants will be volunteers, not forced to obligate 
-Stand-alone provided there is a guarantee that individuals will be available 
for a contingency. 
-Takes the pressure off the current MMR program 
-Create a stand-alone program to ensure non-sailing/retiree pool is qualified 
and has current licenses. Do not compete with MMR program but 
complement it: conduct assessment to revitalize or transform MMR 
-Stand-alone because of the institutional barriers prevent creation of a dual 
USMS/MMR. Keep programs separate. Mariners that do not fit into MMR 
could fit into stand-alone USMS 
-Pool would consist of licensed and unlicensed 
DUAL USMS/MMR: (3) 
-Dual program may have to carry the day in short-run if adequate funding 
cannot be found for stand-alone 
-Dual provides full flexibility and integration. Allows individual to sail as 
civilian or military officer 
-Dual because it will be easier to establish a training program through the 
MMR units 
BOTH STAND-ALONE AND DUAL: (1) 
-Creating both programs gives you the most in terms of licensed and 
unlicensed. More options 
NEITHER OPTIONS: (1) 
- Neither option should be pursed. The stand-alone is too costly and the 
mission of the MMR program is not to crew RRF vessels as a civilian or 
military    
2. Do you in general 
support the initiatives 
that MARAD has 
proposed? 
YES: (8) 
-Something has to be done because the Merchant Marine has shrunk to a 
level that may not be adequate to withstand the pressures of a large scale 
activation 
-Support given the reduction of available qualified merchant marine officers 
-Creates a backup pool 
-The USMS is a better approach then the MMR 
-Yes, because it helps achieve more trained mariners that fill the shortfalls 
-In general, providing the USMS is set up so participants have medical and 
disability coverage and some type of retirement benefits similar to Navy 
-Support stand-alone USMS provided it is not a competing function with 
MMR program 
NO: (2) 
-Program is not affordable and will not get approved 
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Question Opinions of interviewees 
3. Is there a better way 
to achieve "assured 
availability" of 
merchant mariners for 
RRF contingency 
crewing 
-Yes: a healthy, robust U.S. Merchant Marine fleet 
-Increase cargo preference percents for amount of U.S. cargo that U.S. ships 
must carry 
-Use VISA and MSP contracts to create additional billets on board 
-Create more billets on the RRF vessels 
-Incorporate MSC into issue 
-May be other ways, but none of them specifically address the non-sailing 
mariner pool like the USMS concept does 
4. Opinions on whether 
a graduate from the 
USMMA or state 
academy SIP 
participants should have 
the option of directly 
joining the USMS 
-If there was a stand-alone USMS, then joining it would be their obligation 
or an option upon graduation 
-Would be a popular idea with academy graduates (no Navy involvement) 
-Could be an option, but bigger concern is that graduates must actively sail 
to gain experience. If they are actively sailing, then they are considered 
part of active pool, not a backup that is purpose of USMS. If graduates are 
not actively sailing, they need training and experience to be of value to 
USMS pool. 
-Could provide the option, but Navy leadership will resist... do not want to 
lose this pool of uniquely talented officers 
-Against it: they need to join the MMR or active duty after graduation 
Table 4. Summary. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has proposed the development of a 
guaranteed surge pool of experienced inactive mariners available to ensure timely and 
adequate manning of the RRF. This pool would be a supplement, not a replacement, to 
the current active pool of mariners used to crew the RRF. This initiative is centered on 
using the United States Maritime Service (USMS) concept. By using the USMS, there 
are three main approaches to the establishment of a guaranteed pool that MARAD could 
take. First, it could develop a new dedicated stand-alone pool under the sole control of 
MARAD. The second option is to integrate the USMS concept with the Navy's 
Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR) program. The MMR consists of Selected Reservists 
and Individual Ready Reserves (MMIRRG) that have valid USCG licenses. This second 
approach or dual USMS/MMR program would allow MARAD to take advantage of an 
existing program that can provide for the mariner's training and qualification needs, but 
have the flexibility to recall these mariners as civilian mariners instead of military 
officers to serve on RRF vessels. The third approach is to have both a stand-alone USMS 
pool under MARAD and a dual USMS/MMR program. 
The purpose of this research was to provide MARAD and the Navy with elements 
of how this pool could be developed and structured from the perspective of stakeholders 
involved or familiar with the U.S. Merchant Marine, the RRF, and the Navy's MMR 
Program. Data were obtained through a literature review and from fourteen structured 
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interviews. A secondary purpose was to identify the option that stakeholders believe is 
the best approach. 
B.       CONCLUSIONS 
1. A Stand-Alone USMS Program was the Preferred Approach to 
Develop a Backup Pool of Inactive Sailing Mariners 
Of the three options (stand-alone USMS, dual USMS/MMR, or both) to develop a 
backup pool of mariners, a stand-alone USMS program was the most preferred approach 
by the interviewees. The primary reasons for this choice include: 
• A stand-alone USMS program would formally provide a backup pool of 
experienced mariners, both licensed and unlicensed 
• The USMS program would provide quick, guaranteed access to mariners 
• It provides the ability to target specific rates and ranks as well as unique 
RRF skill sets where manning shortages exist. 
• It will help counteract the impact of STCW 95 on the non-sailing and 
retiree pool. It will also provide an incentive to mariners to maintain an 
active license 
• It is a civilian program that is not connected with or influenced by the 
Navy. Additionally, a stand-alone USMS would be a good program for 
previous MMR officers to join 
Despite the numerous advantages and benefits of a stand-alone program, it will 
not be easy to create. The biggest obstacle facing the development of a USMS program 
is funding. This is a new type of program (a backup mariner pool) that has never been 
attempted before. MARAD does not have the necessary manpower, infrastructure, or the 
money in their current budget to support this program. MARAD would need to justify 
and find an additional funding source. Another potential obstacle that needs to be 
addressed is achieving support from stakeholders, specifically the ship managers and 
unions. Consensus and coordination among stakeholders is critical if a USMS program is 
to be developed and accepted. 
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2. Creating a Dual USMS/MMR Program is not the Preferred Approach 
and Such a Program Would Encounter Obstacles and Opposition. 
However, with Some Changes, the Current MMR Program Could Be 
Used as a Backup Pool for RRF Crewing 
Creating a dual USMS/MMR program was not the preferred approach to forming 
a backup pool of inactive mariners. While there are advantages to creating a dual 
USMS/MMR program, they do not outweigh the disadvantages. It also appears that an 
attempt to form this dual program would encounter obstacles and opposition. However, 
with some changes to the existing MMR program, its members could be used to form a 
backup mariner pool to crew RRF vessels during a contingency. The program has 
individuals with USCG licenses not actively sailing who could be used for this given 
purpose. By making changes to the program, MMR officers could be used to crew RRF 
vessels as naval officers. This approach is different from a dual USMS/MMR program 
where these same individuals would have served as civilian mariners, not naval officers, 
onboard RRF vessels. 
The main advantage given for creating a dual program was to leverage an existing 
program (the MMR) with a well established system to administer, recruit, train, track, 
recall, and fund participants. Using the program as it currently exists still has that 
advantage. It also avoids all the issues and structural differences between civilian and 
military created when a program member is technically considered a civilian when 
serving under the USMS, and as military the other times. 
3. Stakeholders Prefer Emphasis on Expanding U.S. Merchant Marine 
to Reliance on Backup Pools 
When asked, interviewees provided their opinions on the USMS option they 
favored to develop a backup pool and also how they believed these programs should be 
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designed. However, given their choice on a better way to achieve "assured access" of 
mariners, the creation of a USMS program was not their preferred approach. They 
believed the best way was for the U.S. to have a robust U.S. Merchant Marine and also to 
create additional sailing billets. 
4.        The   Availability   and   Total   Number   of  Mariners   with   Steam 
Endorsements and Experience are a Major Concern for Stakeholders 
The RRF has 46 vessels that have steam plants. Because the majority of the ships 
in the active U.S. commercial fleet are diesel, there are not many actively sailing 
engineers with steam experience. For example, during Desert Shield/Storm, APL went to 
its retiree list to find all of its Chief Engineers because all 12 of the ships they managed in 
the RRF were steam ships. The youngest retiree was 64 and the oldest 73 years old. This 
highlights another problem, that retired steam engineers may be becoming too old to sail. 
C.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.        The First Step Should Be to Use the USMS Concept to Create a 
Stand-Alone Program 
If the USMS concept is going to be used to help create a backup pool of 
experienced non-sailing mariners, then using it to create a stand-alone program is the best 
method. There are numerous issues that need to be resolved prior to program 
implementation. The various elements that make up a program's structure also need to 
be devised. A description of the issues and elements follows: 
• Mission: MARAD needs to articulate clearly the intended mission of the 
USMS program. MARAD needs to show that there is a specific need for 
the creation of this program and if it is not established, that potential 
consequences could be the inability of the U.S. to complete its strategic 
sealift mission. It also has to be shown how and when this program will 
be used. If the mission and need can be documented, MARAD will have 
a much better chance of selling the program, getting mariners to volunteer, 
and obtaining the required funding and support. 
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Size of program and number of participants: The total number of 
mariners required to form this backup pool needs to be established. This 
will not be an easy task. It is difficult to get accurate information on the 
number of available mariners in the active and inactive sailing pools. 
MARAD will have to use information from many sources (e.g., MARAD 
mariner survey and USCG data) and work with the ship managers and the 
unions to identify where potential shortages exist. Once a general number 
by rank, rate, and qualification is determined, it will drive most of the 
other program requirements. The size of the pool drives how MARAD 
will recruit and establish incentives to attract these mariners, determine the 
scope and goals of the training program, the size of the administrative 
staff, and the funding levels. 
Stakeholder support and involvement: To ensure program success, 
MARAD needs to have stakeholders, specifically the unions and ship 
managers, involved in program development and as active participants. 
Both entities need assurances that this program has several benefits to 
their organizations, not disadvantages. It must be made clear that the 
intent of the stand-alone program is to act as a supplement (a last resort) to 
crewing RRF vessels during a contingency. The intent is not to 
circumvent contracts with ship managers or unions but to provide an 
"insurance policy" if enough qualified mariners cannot be found through 
normal channels. Additionally, once the program is established, the 
unions and ship managers need to remain part of the process with open 
lines of communication. 
Funding and program cost: It will be easier to obtain the necessary 
funding if the need for a stand-alone program is clearly established, the 
size and target number of program participants determined, and 
stakeholders are involved in the planning and considered partners in the 
program. However, it is still important for MARAD to design a program 
that controls costs yet achieve its objectives. 
Entry into the program: The target group of individuals to volunteer for 
a USMS program is retirees and non-sailing mariners working in some 
capacity ashore. One category of mariners that could be required to join 
the USMS is graduates from the USMMA or SIP participants at the state 
academies. The current obligation incurred for these individuals is to 
either go on active duty or join the MMR program. It could be changed so 
they are either required to, or have the option to, join the USMS 
immediately after graduation. It is recommended that being able to join 
either the USMS, go on active duty, or join the MMR program should be 
the obligation options. It is important to note that the goal for these 
graduates is for them to actively sail as merchant mariners (if they do not 
take an active duty commission) after graduation. This would help them 
gain valuable sailing experience, but would make them part of the active 
sailing pool and therefore would not meet the intent of the USMS backup 
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pool. Also, if these graduates were not actively sailing, they would be 
considered part of a backup mariner pool, but must be enrolled in a USMS 
training program to stay proficient. 
Status of USMS participants: The USMS would be considered a 
government program. As such, several questions arise that need to be 
addressed with regard to the status of USMS program participants. 
Questions include, but are not limited to: 
• Are USMS members entitled to veteran status? 
• Are they considered government employees while performing 
training or crewing a RRF vessel? If so, what is the liability of the 
government if the individual kills someone or endangers the crew 
or the ship? Also, if the individual is killed, who is responsible for 
him, the government or the ship manager responsible for the 
vessel? 
• What medical benefits, if any, is the USMS individual entitled to? 
• Since this is a volunteer program, can individuals be involuntarily 
recalled if they do not voluntarily report to a RRF vessel when 
assigned? 
• If a member of the USMS decides to return to actively sailing, 
what happens? Are they still in the USMS pool or do they need to 
pay back the government for money or training provided? 
Incentives: Incentives are critical in order to attract mariners to join the 
USMS program. Two basic types of incentives need to be offered: 
monetary and access to training. To entice a non-sailing mariner to join, 
the government should pay for the cost of the license and the necessary 
qualifications and training needed for that license. The government 
should also pay the mariner at the rate he or she receives when sailing 
while in a training or active status (crewing a RRF vessel). It is 
recommended that a retirement or 401(k) type of plan not be one of the 
initial incentives offered because it could be cost prohibitive. In terms of 
training incentives, access to the courses necessary to maintain their 
qualifications and access to activated RRF vessels or commercial ships 
should be the minimum offered. 
Training: Since mariners in this pool are not actively sailing, they must 
train at some minimum level to maintain their proficiency. A 
comprehensive training plan needs to be developed to track what training 
mariners need and when. Training requirements should be the minimum 
necessary to maintain their current license and any RRF unique skills or 
training as deemed appropriate. Time underway, preferably on a RRF 
vessel two weeks per year, should be the minimum required for 
participants. 
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• Obligation requirements: Program participants should be required to 
obligate in the USMS for five years to coincide with their license renewal 
and physical. In order to receive the incentives and training provided by 
the program, mariners must agree to be recalled to crew RRF vessels and 
to perform the required annual training as specified by their tailored 
training plan. 
• Program management: An office within MARAD should actively 
manage a stand-alone USMS program. Program designers need to ensure 
that adequate manpower and resources are provided to accomplish this 
task. It is also important that the person(s) in charge of the program be 
senior enough to handle all issues and obtain adequate access to policy and 
decision makers. The person in charge of the program or their assistant 
also needs to be an experienced mariner (Chief Mate/Engineer or Master). 
• Incorporate Ship Managers and/or MMROCH units into program 
management: Program designers should also consider taking advantage 
of two established organizations to perform or assist in program 
management. Ship managers perform similar functions needed for 
administering a USMS program on a daily basis. They have the expertise 
to perform some or all of the functions needed for this program. The other 
organization to consider is the MMR Program's MMROCH units. 
Selected Reservists from these units drill at MARAD headquarters and 
three regional offices. They are familiar with MARAD, already are 
funded by the Navy, and are experienced licensed mariners, most serving 
in the maritime industry ashore. 
2. Enact the MOU and Make the Necessary Changes to Allow MMR 
Officers to Crew RRF Vessels during a Contingency 
There is a MOU being developed between the Navy and MARAD to allow MMR 
officers to crew RRF vessels. This would provide the mechanism for guaranteed access 
to MMR officers for contingency crewing. Several comments stakeholders made showed 
they were not opposed to MMR officers serving on RRF vessels in their military 
capacity. If crewing RRF vessels is going to be a new mission for the MMR program, 
the following are some of the necessary steps or actions: 
• Enact the MOU to allow MMR officers to crew RRF vessels 
• CNSRF (N14) needs to complete the survey they are currently conducting 
to determine the current skills and the level of qualification MMR 
members possess 
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• OPNAV N42, CNSRF (N14), and MSC (N-OOR) need to ensure that the 
MMR program's training plan is aligned properly so members have the 
required qualifications to crew RRF vessels 
• CNSRF (N14) needs to determine the actual number of non-sailing MMR 
officers because they will be the ones used for RRF crewing 
• MARAD needs to inform and involve the ship managers and unions so 
they understand how this pool of mariners would be used and how it might 
impact current crewing and operating procedures 
• Possible liability and authority issues need to be worked out between 
MARAD, the Navy, and the ship managers that having naval officers on 
board commercially operated vessels with a civilian crew could bring 
3. MARAD Needs to Continue to Focus on the Active Merchant Marine 
and to Pursue Programs to Increase the Active Sailing Pool and 
Additional Sailing Billets 
MARAD and the other agencies involved in strategic sealift need to continue to 
focus on programs to keep the U.S. Merchant Marine viable. This can be accomplished 
by having an increase in the number of U.S. commercial ships and or an increase in the 
number of seagoing billets on existing commercial and government ships. 
Recommendations to achieve this include: 
• Increase cargo preference percentages for the amount of U.S. cargo that 
U.S. commercial ships must carry 
• Leverage VISA and MSP contracts to require additional onboard billets 
• Create more full-time billets on RRF vessels 
4. Properly Address and Target Mariners with Steam Experience 
If a USMS program is developed, it must address the issue of the number and 
availability of mariners with steam experience. This group of mariners must be one of 
the first targeted and recruited into the program because there are not a sufficient number 
of mariners with this skill in the active sailing pool to crew the RRF. Specific 
recommendations include: 
• A USMS pool must provide the proper incentives to entice mariners with 
steam experience to join 
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• If there is not an adequate number of mariners available to fill a 
predetermined number of billets needed to crew the 46 RRF steam vessels, 
the USMS program could be used as the method to train diesel engineers 
to operate steam plants 
• A USMS training program should require mariners to take the proper 
courses and also require these mariners to operate RRF vessels with steam 
plants a minimum of two weeks a year 
D.       SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
Areas for future studies include: 
• Conduct a study to determine how many inactive mariners are needed for 
a stand-alone USMS program. Based on those numbers, a cost analysis 
should be conducted of the various components that would make up the 
program such as administration, training, incentives, and travel to identify 
the main ones. 
• Assess how a stand-alone USMS program could be used or modified to 
provide personnel to crew MSC vessels, or ships in either the VISA or 
MSP programs if mariner shortages occur. 
• Conduct a survey of USMMA students and SIP participants at the state 
maritime academies to assess their thoughts on the USMS. How do they 
feel about the current obligation to go on active duty or join a reserve 
program? Would they be in favor of joining the USMS upon graduation? 
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APPENDIX A. STRATEGIC SEALIFT ASSETS (FROM MSC 2001) 
Category              Di 
MSC Force 
Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) 8 
Large Medium-Speed RO/RO (LMSR) 14 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) 14 
PREPO (USNS) 
PREPO (U.S. Charters) 9 
PREPO (RRF Tendered to MSC) 2 
RRF Tendered to MSC 0 
Other U.S. Charters 3 




Ready Reserve Force 
Auxiliary Crane Ship (T-ACS) 
Breakbulk (BB) 
Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) 
Sea Barge (SEABEE) 
Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) 
Combo 
























Effective U. S. Control 
Other Allies 
Overall Total 319 166 
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APPENDIX B. READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS AND MANNING 
FOR FY 2002 -2005 (FROM TOKARSKI2000) 









1 ADMIRAL WM CALLAGHAN 4 5 4 5 12 26 
2 ALATNA 10 10 15 25 
3 AMERICAN OSPREY 30 11 22 33 
4 BEAVER STATE 4 5 6 5 22 38 
5 CAPE ALEXANDER 5 5 6 4 21 36 
6 CAPE ANN 10 11 25 36 
7 CAPE ARCHWAY 10 11 25 36 
8 CAPE AVINOF 5 5 6 4 21 36 
9 CAPE BLANCO 5 5 6 4 16 31 
10 CAPE BORDA 5 5 6 4 16 31 
11 CAPE BOVER 5 5 6 4 16 31 
12 CAPE BRETON 10 11 20 31 
13 CAPE DECISION 4 5 5 5 12 27 
14 CAPE DIAMOND 4 5 5 5 12 27 
15 CAPE DOMINGO 4 5 5 5 12 27 
16 CAPE DOUGLAS 4 5 5 5 12 27 
17 CAPE DUCATO 4 5 5 5 12 27 
18 CAPE EDMONT 4 5 5 5 12 27 
19 CAPE FAREWELL 10 11 19 30 
20 CAPE FEAR 10 11 19 30 
21 CAPE FLATTERY 10 11 19 30 
22 CAPE FLORIDA 10 11 19 30 
23 CAPE GIBSON 5 5 6 4 17 32 
24 CAPE GIRARDEAU 5 5 6 4 17 32 
25 CAPE HENRY 5 5 5 4 15 29 
26 CAPE HORN 4 5 5 5 13 28 
27 CAPE HUDSON 4 5 5 5 13 28 
28 CAPE INSCRIPTION 5 5 6 4 19 34 
29 CAPE INTREPID 4 5 6 5 18 34 
30 CAPE ISABEL 5 5 6 4 19 34 
31 CAPE ISLAND 4 5 6 5 18 34 
32 CAPE JACOB PREPO 36 
33 CAPE JOHN 5 5 6 4 21 36 
34 CAPE JOHNSON 5 5 6 4 21 36 
35 CAPE JUBY 5 5 6 4 21 36 
36 CAPE KENNEDY 4 5 4 5 14 28 
37 CAPE KNOX 4 5 4 5 14 28 
38 CAPE LAMBERT 10 11 20 31 
39 CAPE LOBOS 10 11 20 31 
40 CAPE MAY 5 5 8 "4 16 33 
KB 
41 CAPE MENDOCINO 10 13 20 33 
42 CAPE MOHICAN 5 5 8 4 16 33 
43 CAPE NOME 10 11 25 36 
44 CAPE ORLANDO 4 5 4 5 11 25 
45 CAPE RACE 4 5 6 5 12 28 
46 CAPE RAY 4 5 6 5 12 28 
47 CAPE RISE 5 5 6 4 13 28 
48 CAPE TAYLOR 4 5 4 5 12 26 
49 CAPE TEXAS 4 5 4 5 12 26 
50 CAPE TRINITY 4 5 4 5 12 26 
51 CAPE VICTORY 4 5 4 5 11 25 
52 CAPE VINCENT 4 5 4 5 11 25 
53 CAPE WASHINGTON 5 5 4 4 16 29 
54 CAPE WRATH 5 5 4 4 16 29 
55 CHATTAHOOCHEE 10 10 15 25 
56 CHESAPEAKE PREPO 33 
57 COMET 10 10 23 33 
58 CORNHUSKER STATE 5 5 6 4 21 36 
59 CURTISS 5 5 6 4 25 40 
60 DIAMOND STATE 4 5 6 5 24 40 
61 EMPIRE STATE 10 14 54 68 
62 EQUALITY STATE 4 5 6 5 24 40 
63 FLICKERTAIL STATE 5 5 6 4 21 36 
64 GEM STATE 5 5 6 4 22 37 
65 GOPHER STATE PREPO 33 
66 GRAND CANYON STATE 4 5 6 5 21 37 
67 GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE 4 5 6 5 22 38 
68 KEYSTONE STATE 5 5 6 4 22 37 
69 METEOR 10 11 20 31 
70 MISSION BUENAVENTURA 20 11 21 32 
71 MISSION CAPISTRANO 20 11 18 29 
72 MOUNT WASHINGTON 5 ..  5 6 4 18 33 
73 NODAWAY 10 10 15 25 
74 PATRIOT ST./GOLD. BEAR 10 14 54 68 
75 PETERSBURG PREPO 33 
76 POTOMAC 10 11 22 33 
77 WRIGHT 5 5 6 4 25 40 
TOTALS: 255 525 230 1361 2506    | 
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RRF Summary Data: 
Licensed Unlicensed Total 
Total RRF PREPO 44 91 135 
Total RRF ROS 255 230 485 
Total RRF Surge 525 1361 1886 
Total RRF 824 1682 2506 
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL PROVIDED TO 
INTERVIEWEES 
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has proposed the development of a 
surge pool of experienced inactive merchant mariners who could be called upon in time 
of contingency crewing needs, dedicated to RRF service. This pool would be a 
supplement, not replacement, to the current active pool of mariners that the RRF draws 
from. 
This pool would be developed using the United States Maritime Service (USMS) 
concept. The USMS was initially established in 1938 by President Roosevelt to train 
merchant mariners for the purpose of crewing merchant ships during World War Two. 
The legal authority for MARAD to reestablish the USMS is granted in the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 and is still valid today. The statue authorizes the development of a 
USMS but does not specify or place restrictions on how the USMS should be structured. 
There are two basic approaches for the development of a pool that are being 
considered: Option 1 is a stand-alone USMS pool under MARAD. Option 2 is a USMS 
program that is integrated with the Navy's Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR) Program. 
A possible third option is to create both option 1 and option 2. 
The purpose of my research is to provide MARAD and the Navy with elements of 
how this pool could be developed and structured from the perspective of stakeholders 
involved or familiar with the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Ready Reserve Force and the 
Navy's Merchant Marine Reserve. 
Questions will be asked in the order presented below.   Each question will be 
asked once as it pertains to the creation of a stand-alone USMS pool, then again for a 
dual USMS/MMR pool. 
Research Questions: 
1. What are the major advantages and disadvantages for each of these options? 
2. What incentives are needed to entice individual mariners to join and remain in 
the program and for affected organizations to support/participate in a USMS program? 
3. What should be the training and qualification requirements? 
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4. What should be the sign up and obligation requirements for members 
participating in the program? 
5. What organization(s) should manage the program? 
6. What are the obstacles (real or perceived) in using the USMS concept? What 
rules, regulations, procedures, policies, and/or laws need to be changed or modified to 
accomplish this task? 
7. What are the opinions of stakeholders on the forming of a stand-alone pool or 
dual USMS/MMR pool? 
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APPENDIX D. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL WITH PROBE 
QUESTIONS 
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
1. Demographic Data / Background Data 
Job title and description, organization, years of mariner experience and/or 
interaction and background information 
Rating/position/highest USCG qualification 
2. Describe your current or past interactions, if any, with MARAD? With the 
Ready Reserve Force? With the Merchant Marine Reserve Program? Strategic sealift 
involvement? 
1. What are the major advantages and disadvantages for each of these 
options? 
3. What advantages do you see for the maritime industry and the RRF in the 
establishment of the stand-alone USMS option? Any disadvantages? 
Probes: 
Increase number of mariners available to man RRF vessels (Adv) 
Excellent training opportunities (Adv) 
Ensure that certain rates have adequate back-up numbers (Adv) 
Additional costs (disadvantage) 
4. What advantages do you see for a dual USMS/MMR option? Any 
disadvantages? 
Leverage an existing program (Adv) 
Funding is already being provided for training and qualifications (Adv) 
No non-licensed members (disadvantage) 
Cultural bias towards military (disadvantage) 
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Current membership is too junior (3rd mates or engineers) 
Who and how many do you allow to participate 
5. What are the most advantageous aspects, if any, of these two options to your 
sector? Any disadvantageous aspects? 
2. What incentives are needed to entice individual mariners to join and 
remain in the program and for affected organizations to support/participate in a 
USMS program? 
6. What concerns do you or your organization have about the creation of a stand- 
alone pool? About a USMS/MMR pool? 
7. Based on those concerns, what type of incentives or assurances would you or 
your organization need to buy in or support this program? 
8. What incentives or program characteristics do you think are needed or should 
be provided to get mariners to join the program? 
Probes: 
Pay for their qualifications, license renewal, and STCW 
Provide and pay for training opportunities to maintain operational currency 
Minimal administrative requirements, especially Navy regulations 
Medical or military facility benefits/access 
Others 
3. What are the training and qualification requirements? 
9. What training opportunities (and frequency) would you envision providing to 
pool members? 
10. How would you ensure that USMS members possess and retain the unique 
skill or qualifications that are associated with RRF vessels (i.e. steam plants)? 
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4. What should be the sign up and obligation requirements for members 
participating in the program? 
11. What type of sign up and obligation requirement do you think is necessary for 
members participating in the program? 
Probes: 
Numbers of years to obligate, 
That they will sail if called upon and keep their license and qualifications current 
during the period, 
That they will keep recall info current and notify in the event of a change of 
info/status) 
5. What organization(s) should manage the program? 
12. What organization or organizations do you think should manage or 
coordinate a stand-alone USMS program? A dual USMS/MMR program? 
Probes: 
A totally new organization 
Current code in MARAD 
The Program Manager office for MMR (CNSRF N14) 
MMR members that drill with MARAD 
Ship managers and/or unions with MARAD oversight 
6. What are the obstacles (real or perceived) in using the USMS concept? 
What rules, regulations, procedures, policies, and/or laws need to be changed or 
modified to accomplish this task? 
13. Are there any obstacles in the way preventing the developing a stand-alone 
program? A USMS/MMR program? 
Ill 
Probes: Any rules, regulations, procedures, policies, or laws 
Funding issues 
Structural Issues 
Cultural Issues or differences 
7. What are the opinions of stakeholders on the forming of a stand-alone 
pool or dual USMS/MMR pool? 
14. Should the program be limited to non-actively sailing mariners? 
15. (PRIMARY QUESTION) To wrap up our discussion, of the 3 options 
proposed, a stand-alone USMS pool under MARAD control, a dual USMS and 
MMR program, or both, which do you think is the best approach: Why? 
16. Do you in general support the initiatives that MARAD has proposed? 
17. If these pools were designed as you have suggested, would you support their 
establishment? Why or why not? 
18. Is there a better way to achieve "assured availability" of merchant mariners 
for RRF crewing in addition to the current process? 
19. Is there anything else you would like to add that we have talked about? Do 
you have any questions for me? 
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